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BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF LOVE: THE
ENFORCEMENT OF PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS
AND HOW WE THINK ABOUT MARRIAGE
BRIAN Bix"
INTRODUCTION
Premarital agreements' stand at a crossroads of many impor-
tant topics: contract and family law, public interest and private
ordering, feminism, and law and economics. The agreements
give unique insights into all of these areas, bringing out issues
and problems in a singularly clear way, e.g., how we think about
marriage and relational contracts, and how the law should re-
spond to limitations of rationality and to systematic inequalities.
As will become clear, this topic is deceptively far-reaching: a
proper consideration of the enforcement of premarital agree-
ments touches upon issues as diverse as same-sex marriage, re-
strictive covenants, surrogacy agreements, and copyright law.
Past discussions of premarital agreements have tended to be
either unduly pessimistic or unduly sanguine regarding the en-
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Ertman, Martha Fineman, Stephen Gilles, Kent Greenfield, Claire Ariane Hill,
Stanton Krauss, Leonard Long, Alexander Meiklejohn, Linda Meyer, Martha Minow,
Thomas Morawetz, Frances Olsen, Louis Parley, Eric Posner, David Rosettenstein,
Carol Sanger, Katharine Silbaugh, Adam Tomkins, Carol Weisbrod, and Eyal Zamir,
as well as to those who attended the March 1998 Columbia University Workshop,
"Economic Discourse and the Family," and workshops at Boston College Law School,
University of Connecticut School of Law, and Quinnipiac College School of Law, for
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
The title obviously plays off of Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser's clas-
sic article, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950 (1979). Apologies to Amy L. Wax, of whose parallel article title, Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L.
REV. 509 (1998), I was unaware until this Article was well along.
1. These agreements are also known as "prenuptial agreements" and "antenuptial
agreements."
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forcement of premarital agreements under traditional contract
principles.2 The pessimists think that enforcement of the agree-
ments inevitably will lead to grave injustice;3 the optimists
think that enforcement of these types of agreements must al-
ways increase social welfare, as this is the inevitable result of
enforcing all voluntary choices.4 This Article challenges the
views of the pessimists, arguing that the resources of current
contract law can protect parties from most of the forms of un-
fairness that tend to result from premarital agreements, and
still provide parties who have a good faith desire to order their
own domestic lives with the necessary legal powers to do so. At
the same time, this Article argues, relevant to the optimists'
claims, that these sorts of agreements raise difficult questions
regarding consent and rationality that the courts can and should
consider.
Premarital agreements for many years were of interest to the
rich and their lawyers,5 to a handful of academics, and to no
one else. In recent years, they apparently have become more
common-a trend reflected by, and probably also encouraged by,
the attention these agreements command in the popular press.6
2. Compare Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229, 279 (1994) ("Lawmakers should recognize premarital
agreements for what they are: contracts that violate societal norms against gender
discrimination.") with Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A
New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 207-11, 216-23, 285-86, 288-91,
328-34 (1982) (viewing optimistically the private ordering of marriage, in particular
premarital agreements relating to economic matters).
3. See, e.g., Brod, supra note 2, at 294 ("Premarital agreements have a disparate
impact on women-and thereby discriminate against them.").
4. See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Per-
sonalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 472 (1998) (assuming that enforc-
ing agreements about marriage creates net gains in trades away from the default
position, though noting that there may be distributional concerns about the division
of those gains).
5. See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, How They Keep It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, Sunday
Magazine, at 104 (reciting ten clauses from the premarital agreements of the very
rich).
6. See, e.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, Prenuptial Contracts Find New Popularity, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, at B5; Noreen Marcus, For Love and Money Prenups; Mar-
riage Contracts-No Longer Just for the Rich, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Sept.
28, 1997, at 1A, available in 1997 WL 11404515; Julie Salamon, Popping the Pre-
Nup Question, NEW YORKER, Aug. 25-Sept. 1, 1997, at 70-79; cf Allison A. Marston,
Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV.
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Much academic discussion of premarital agreements has failed
to consider the larger conceptual, doctrinal, and real-world con-
text surrounding them, or has considered only one aspect of the
larger context, e.g., gender inequality, while ignoring others.7
These narrow or partial discussions inevitably fail to see the
whole problem, or to consider all of its complexities or all of its
possibilities. They thus tend to come too quickly to extreme con-
clusions, for example, that courts always should enforce the
agreements or that courts should place strict controls on them.'
It would be better to look at all of the facets that these various
approaches explore, to illuminate better the whole picture, to get
more than one view of the cathedral.9
This Article attempts to place the question of the enforcement
of premarital agreements in three overlapping contexts. After
Part I of the Article offers a brief overview of the legal status of
premarital agreements, Part II evaluates the extent to which
marriage itself is now or should become a contractual or near-
contractual relationship. Part III reviews the approach the law
does take, and, to the extent it is different, the approach it
should take, to long-term ("relational") agreements. Part IV con-
siders the problem of pervasive inequalities in society, in partic-
ular gender inequalities.
887, 890-97 (1997) (questioning "the assumption that only the rich, the selfish, or
the mercenary" can benefit from premarital agreements). Note also that a premarital
agreement form is available on a popular computer software program aimed at the
general public, "Quicken Family Lawyer," by Parsons Technology.
7. See, e.g., Brod, supra note 2 (focusing on gender equality); Leah
Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Premarital Agreements, 17
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 147 (1996) (same).
8. See, e.g., Brod, supra note 2, at 282-95 (proposing restrictions on enforcement
to ensure "economic justice"); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce,
45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 415-25 (1992) (arguing broadly for the enforceability of pre-
marital agreements).
9. With deference and apologies to Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); cf BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 15-
32 (1996) (arguing that "competing" conceptual theories can be seen as emphasizing
different aspects of the same social practice).
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I. ENFORCEMENT AND PERCEPTION
A. Overview of Enforceability
The legal attitude toward premarital agreements has changed
markedly in the past thirty years, though it is far from clear
whether this development reflects shifting attitudes toward the
family, marriage, family law, contract law, or all of these." As
state courts and legislatures continue to choose between differ-
ing approaches to the enforcement of premarital agreements, it
is worth considering what may be at stake. Among the issues
the inquiry most obviously raises are the general move from sta-
tus to contract in the legal regulation of marriage, our attitudes
toward marriage itself, problems of rationality in long-term
agreements, and the complex intersection of family law and gen-
der equality.
Premarital agreements are agreements parties enter into
when they are about to marry.1 In the standard, if somewhat
archaic, formulation, the agreements are "in contemplation of
marriage." They concern the rights of the parties during the
marriage and/or upon the dissolution of the marriage by death
or divorce. 2 In this Article, as in most of the relevant second-
10. See infra notes 17-58 and accompanying text.
11. That the parties are about to marry might be of importance doctrinally. If one
party is giving up his or her legal rights, the only consideration for that sacrifice, as
a matter of conventional common law, may be the agreement by the other party to
enter the marriage. See Matthews v. Matthews, 162 S.E.2d 697, 698-99 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1968) (refusing enforcement of an agreement entered during marriage due to
lack of consideration). Alternatively, even without consideration, the promises in a
premarital agreement might be enforceable as a matter of promissory estoppel. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Additionally, many states follow
the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) view that premarital agreements are
enforceable without consideration. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2, 9B
U.L.A. 372 (1987). For more on the UPAA, see infra notes 34-38 and accompanying
text.
12. Agreements entered into prior to marriage (or during marriage) attempting to
set the terms of behavior during marriage usually are held not to be enforceable.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 297 (Cal. 1973) (concerning
medical care); Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App.) (addressing sexu-
al intercourse), rev'd on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976). But see Laura P.
Graham, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Poli-
cy: The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1037, 1039 (1993) (arguing that courts should enforce such
148
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ary literature and most of the reported decisions regarding
premarital agreements, focus is placed upon agreements that
include provisions relating to the rights of the parties upon
divorce. 1"
The general view of premarital agreements derives in large
part from their perceived purpose. One commentator has stated
that "[tihe purpose and effect of most premarital agreements is
to protect the wealth and earnings of an economically superior
spouse from being shared with an economically inferior
spouse.""' Though there does not seem to be substantial empiri-
cal study documenting the relative frequency of various kinds
and purposes of premarital agreements, 5 even if the one-sided
agreements reflect only a small percentage of all premarital
agreements).
Additionally, as a general rule, courts will not enforce premarital agreements to
the extent that they cover child custody, visitation, or child care payments. See, e.g.,
Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 946 (Ky. 1990); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d
417, 419 (Utah 1986); 2 STEPHEN W. SCHLISSEL ET AL., SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
AND MARITAL CONTRACTS § 15A.02, at 311 & n.10 (2d ed. 1997).
13. As a matter of history and function, there are good reasons for treating death-
focused and divorce-focused agreements together, or even giving most of the atten-
tion to death-focused agreements. Until recently, because death was a more common
way for a marriage to end than divorce, agreements meant to keep wealth within a
family certainly would focus on death as well as, if not to the exclusion of, divorce.
The fact remains, however, that divorce-focused agreements have experienced a dis-
tinct legal treatment, and raise issues that death-focused agreements do not. See in-
fra note 26 and accompanying text (noting the different ways Massachusetts courts
have treated death-focused and divorce-focused agreements).
Premarital agreements of a different sort have a secure place in American legal
history regarding the treatment of women in the nineteenth century. Though the
traditional common-law rule had been that the husband gained control over all of
the wife's property after marriage, in jurisdictions such as New York, equity would
recognize and enforce premarital agreements by which the husband allowed his wife
to control part or all of her property. This recognition, however, tended to benefit
only wealthy women. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW 70-88, 109-11,
226-27 (1982).
14. Brod, supra note 2, at 234.
15. Brod cites the scarcity of empirical study in this area, and also notes that
none of the work done purports to be systematic or statistically valid. See id. at 240
n.49. Brod supports some of her generalizations in part with information gathered
from interviews with family law attorneys and specialists. See id. at 234 n.15, 238
n.41, 243 n.67. Allison Marston cites to estimates that "the number of prenuptial
agreements tripled between 1978 and 1988 and has steadily increased ever since"
and that approximately 5% of all marriages, and 20% of all remarriages, involve
premarital agreements. Marston, supra note 6, at 891 (footnote omitted).
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agreements, society still must decide how the legal system
should treat those relative few. At the same time, the abuses of
a few should not color the response to all premarital agree-
ments. Other possible purposes of such agreements include: (1)
ensuring that children from a prior marriage retain certain
family wealth, despite possible claims by the new spouse; (2)
assuring the economically weaker spouse-to-be that he or she
will have adequate economic protection after divorce; (3) at-
tempting to make any eventual divorce simpler and less conten-
tious; and (4) assuring that certain family heirlooms or family
wealth stay within a family upon divorce.16
Until the mid-1970s, most American courts held that premari-
tal agreements and other contracts made "in contemplation of
divorce" were unenforceable as against public policy. Courts
reasoned that the agreements were void either (1) because they
purported to alter the state-imposed terms of the status of mar-
riage, which were not subject to individual alteration, 7 or (2)
because they tended to encourage divorce. 8
16. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMnLY LAW 801 (3d ed. 1998) (listing financial
protection of children from the prior marriage as "the usual explanation" for premar-
ital agreements, while also mentioning the use of such agreements by wealthy peo-
ple seeking to limit the financial claims of new spouses, even when no children from
a prior marriage are involved); Sarah Ann Smith, The Unique Agreements: Premari-
tal and Marital Agreements, Their Impact upon Estate Planning, and Proposed Solu-
tions to Problems Arising at Death, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 833, 836-38 (1991-1992) (list-
ing purposes for premarital agreements).
17. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 938-40 (E.D. Mich. 1940) (re-
fusing to enforce an agreement by which the wife promised to make monthly pay-
ments to the husband if he would travel with her, and holding that this contract
was void because it changed the "essential obligations of. . .marriage").
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 584. See generally Norris v.
Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368, 369-70 (Iowa 1970) (citing cases; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 584; 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 12, 942, 943; and Anno-
tation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Provision in Antenuptial Contract For-
feiting Property Rights of Innocent Spouse on Separation or Filing of Divorce or Oth-
er Matrimonial Action, 57 A.L.R.2d 942 (1958), for the unenforceability of such provi-
sions).
Under English law, premarital agreements were, until recently, similarly put
into the category of agreements that are void because contrary to public policy. The
leading case regarding premarital agreements in England had been the 1853 decision
in Cartwright v. Cartwright, 43 Eng. Rep. 385 (L.J. Ch. 1853). In Cartwright, the fa-
ther of the husband-to-be conveyed certain property rights to the wife-to-be with a
proviso that, should the couple separate for any reason, those rights would go to the
150
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In fact, the most recent restatement of contract law continues
to declare: "A promise that tends unreasonably to encourage di-
vorce or separation is unenforceable on grounds of public poli-
cy."19 The vast majority of courts, however, now treats premari-
tal agreements as enforceable, at least in some circumstances. 0
husband. See id. at 385. The Lord Justices held the contract void as against public
policy, because it gave an inducement to the parties to separate. See id. at 387-89.
The Lord Justices were not persuaded by the argument that the agreement actually
encouraged one party, the wife, to stay in the marriage; they thought it more signif-
icant that the other party, the husband, had an incentive to dissolve the bond. See
id. Though Cartwright did not involve an agreement directly between a future hus-
band and wife, it generally was accepted as applying to premarital agreements be-
tween the spouses-to-be. See, e.g., 1 CHITY ON CONTRACTS, § 16-063, at 811 & n.71
(A.G. Guest et al. eds., 27th ed. 1994); S.M. CRETNEY & J. M. MASSON, PRINCIPLES
OF FAMILY LAW 447-48 (5th ed. 1990). Recent treatment of premarital agreements by
the English courts appears to be far more accepting. Though there do not appear to
be many decisions or commentaries that discuss the issue at length, the law appears
to treat premarital agreements much as it does separation agreements: the court
must take such agreements into account when making awards and granting proper-
ty, but it is not bound by the agreements. See N v. N (Foreign Divorce: Financial
Relief) [1997] 1 FLR 900, at 912-13 (High Court, Family Division) (premarital agree-
ment); Edgar v. Edgar [1981] FLR 19 (Court of Appeal) (separation agreement).
In Israel, the law appears to treat both premarital agreements and separation
agreements as presumptively enforced. However, such agreements only are en-
forceable if a court or registrar has determined that each party formed the agree-
ment with "free consent" and with an understanding of the legal rights being
waived. See Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 313 (1972-73).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190(2) (1981).
In Kovler v. Vagenheim, 333 Mass. 252 (1955), the brothers of a woman, in
consideration of a man's marrying the woman, had indemnified the man regarding
any payments of alimony or child support that he might owe upon divorce. See id.
at 252-53. The court held the contract valid and, in response to the argument that
the agreement encouraged divorce, pointed out that (1) the contract was clearly "in
aid of, not in derogation of, marriage," and (2) any influence it might exert to en-
courage separation or divorce would be "trifling." Id. at 254. One difference between
this case and most modern cases, and a factor noted by the court in Kovler, was
that the agreement did not impair the obligation to support-the agreement was not
that no one could claim such payments, but only that if someone did claim them, a
different source would pay them. See id.
20. Many commentators look to Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), as
the turning point for states' treatment of premarital contracts. See, e.g., Lewis
Becker, Premarital Agreements: An Overview, in PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CON-
TRACTS 1, 6 (Edward L. Winer & Lewis Becker eds., 1993); Brod, supra note 2, at
264-65; see also Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 815 (Mass. 1981) (describing
Posner as the leading case). Though the court in Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596
(Okla. 1960), also upheld a premarital contract that involved the waiver of alimony
rights upon divorce, few other courts followed during that decade. Other important
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Current applications of the Restatement rule seem to emphasize
the "unreasonably" part rather than the "encourage... separa-
tion" part, with most courts concluding, if they reach the ques-
tion at all, that premarital agreements do not encourage separa-
tion "unreasonably."2
Agreements in reported cases that one might characterize as
"unreasonably encouraging divorce" still appear, but they are
few and far between. One such agreement in California con-
tained unusually generous terms; it promised the previously des-
titute spouse a house and at least half a million dollars upon
divorce." Perhaps not surprisingly, the marriage ended after
only seven months.' The wife sued for divorce, but the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals refused to enforce the agreement.' The
court stated that the wife had been "encouraged by the very
terms of the agreement to seek a dissolution, and with all
deliberate speed, lest the husband suffer an untimely demise,
nullifying the contract and the wife's right to the money and
property.")
early decisions include: In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976); Osborne
v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981); and Unander v. Unander, 506 P.2d 719
(Or. 1973).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190(2) (1981). See, e.g., Osborne, 428
N.E.2d at 816 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 and noting that,
while premarital agreements that meet fairness guidelines will generally be enforced,
"certain contracts may so unreasonably encourage divorce as to be unenforceable on
grounds of public policy").
22. See In re Marriage of Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
The agreement promised the wife, in the case of a divorce, "the house ... [in]
Sunnyvale, . . . [a]nd $500,000.00 or one-half of my assets, whichever is greater.'
Id. There was a dispute among the parties as to whether the wife-to-be and her
family forced the agreement upon the husband-to-be, or whether the husband-to-be
offered the agreement as a sign of his good intentions. See id. at 156-57.
Noghrey predated California's adoption of the UPAA. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§
1600-1617 (West 1994) (effective January 1986). The effect of the UPAA on Noghrey
has yet to be determined. See In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 872 n.4
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (applying Noghrey to a case with similar facts, while noting
that the California UPAA did not apply because the agreement was entered into
prior to 1986).
23. See Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
24. See id. at 155.
25. Id. at 156. The court added, "The prospect of receiving a house and a mini-
mum of $500,000 by obtaining the no-fault divorce available in California would
menace the marriage of the best intentioned spouse." Id. at 157.
152
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The public policy consideration also may explain why some
courts historically treated death-focused premarital agreements
somewhat differently. These are agreements that affect property
division upon the death of one of the spouses. Courts treated
these types of agreements with far less hostility than divorce-
focused premarital agreements. Courts subjected the death-fo-
cused agreements to -certain restrictions, but tended to enforce
them at times when they refused to enforce divorce-focused
agreements.26 The doctrinal explanation was that death-focused
premarital agreements did not give either party an incentive to
divorce. One also might speculate that an attempt to keep a
family heirloom or other family property within a fami-
ly-apparently a common purpose of such agreements-is more
sympathetic than a divorce-focused agreement, in which,
paradigmatically, a richer prospective spouse asks a poorer pro-
spective spouse to give up rights to all but a small part of the
wealth and income of the richer prospective spouse."
In any event, in the 1970s and early 1980s,'the public policy
argument began to lose its persuasiveness, or at least became
insufficiently weighty for making premarital agreements per se
invalid.28 Courts remained hesitant about enforcement, howev-
er, and they developed tests for evaluating the procedural fair-
ness of the agreement-inquiring whether the parties disclosed
their financial situations, whether any waiver of rights was
accomplished with knowledge of the rights waived, and whether
the parties consulted attorneys or at least had the opportunity
to do so-and the substantive fairness of the agreement at the
26. Compare Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 377 Mass. 666, 666-67 (1979) (enforcing a
death-focused premarital agreement) with Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 815
(Mass. 1981) (holding for the first time in Massachusetts that divorce-focused pre-
marital contracts would be enforceable).
27. See Brod, supra note 2, at 243.
28. Some might argue that the push toward writing and enforcing premarital
agreements also came from another direction: the willingness of courts to award
large sums to partners in long-term cohabitation relationships, under theories of ex-
press contract, implied contract, unjust enrichment, and the like. See, e.g., Marvin v.
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 118 (Cal. 1976); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 305 (Wis. 1987).
Such awards meant that the rich could not assume that they could avoid having to
give large portions of their property to their current domestic partners simply by not
getting married. Marriage, but with a premarital agreement, became one obvious
alternative.
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time of signing and/or at the time of enforcement." Most juris-
dictions enforced only those premarital agreements that sur-
vived scrutiny of both their procedure and their substance."
Most of the jurisdictions applying these fairness requirements
held premarital agreements to a higher standard than they held
ordinary agreements under comparable protective doctrines of
standard contract law such as unconscionability, misrepresenta-
tion, and duress.3' Until the early years of this decade, this was
the majority approach to the enforcement of premarital agree-
ments. 2 The details of the standards varied, and continue to
vary slightly from state to state,3 but these slightly differing
standards can be fruitfully characterized as variations on a
single approach, which this Article refers to as "the fairness
approach."
In 1983, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uni-
form State Laws approved the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act (UPAA), which has since been adopted by roughly half of the
states." At first glance, the provisions of the UPAA might ap-
29. See, e.g., Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550-51 (Wis. 1986); DeLong v.
DeLong, No. WD 52726, 1998 Mo. App. LEXIS 69, at *36-*37 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 20,
1998).
30. See, e.g., Osborne, 428 N.E.2d at 814-17; Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506
(Ohio 1984).
31. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (describing the
standard approach to premarital agreements as having "embodied substantial depar-
tures from traditional rules of contract law," requiring a standard of reasonableness
more exacting than the traditional defenses of "fraud, misrepresentation, [and] du-
ress").
32. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 822-23 (discussing "the general trend");
LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 694-95 (1996) (summarizing the standard "in
most states").
33. Compare Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1990) (evaluating
fairness relative to the time of enforcement) with Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546,
551 (Wis. 1986) (holding that the fairness of terms are to be evaluated relative to
the time of execution of the agreement).
34. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987). As of May
1998, 26 jurisdictions had adopted the UPAA. See id. at 78 (Supp. 1998) (listing
jurisdictions). For a critical evaluation of the UPAA, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten
Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J.
LEGIS. 127, 129-30 (1993). The Uniform Marital Property Act, § 10, 9A U.LA 121
(1987), has similar provisions, but to date Wisconsin is the only state that has
adopted it.
Premarital agreements are not covered at length in the current American Law
154
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pear to implement the fairness approach described above. In
fact, the UPAA is much less likely to justify invalidation of an
agreement. Under the uniform act, an agreement will not be
enforced under only one of two sets of circumstances: (1) if it is
shown that there was a lack of voluntariness on the part of one
of the parties (a conventional defense under contract law);" or
(2) on the grounds that (a) the agreement was substantively un-
reasonable, i.e. "unconscionable," at the time of execution, and
(b) the aggrieved party did not have adequate knowledge of the
other party's financial position." Additionally, the UPAA holds
that if th6 enforcement of an agreement modifying or eliminat-
ing spousal support were to leave the party in question on public
assistance, a court may modify the agreement to the extent nec-
essary to maintain the party above the level of public assis-
tance.3" Although a party could prevent enforcement of an
agreement under a fairness approach by showing either lack of
full disclosure or extreme unfairness of terms, under the UPAA
someone trying to prevent enforcement must show both.8 In-
Institute drafts on Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recom-
mendations, despite the fact that the "Proposed Final Draft" (Feb. 14, 1997) devotes
an entire chapter to "Division of Property Upon Dissolution." Ira Mark Elhnan, the
Chief Reporter, has confirmed that premarital agreements were not part of the scope
of the project, and that there is no general treatment of such agreements within the
current drafts. E-mail from Ira Mark EUman, Chief Reporter, Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution, to Brian Bix, Professor, Quinnipiac College School of Law
(Jan. 30, 1998) (on file with author).
35. See UNIF. PREMARTAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. at 376.
36. The UPAA allows enforcement without financial disclosure when there has
been waiver of the right to enforcement or when the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought obtained or reasonably could have obtained the information from an-
other source. Section 6(a)(2) of the UPAA holds that an agreement will not be en-
forceable if
the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before exe-
cution of the agreement, [the party against whom enforcement is sought]:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property
or financial obligations of the other party;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party
beyond the disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
Id. § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. at 376.
37. See id. § 6(c), 9B U.L. . at 376.
38. See Atwood, supra note 34, at 146 (explaining that, under the UPAA, "uncon-
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deed, the UPAA approach appears to require a greater showing
before invalidating an agreement than would conventional con-
tract law. Under conventional contract standards, unconsciona-
ble terms are not enforceable, and a court also could invalidate
an agreement for lack of disclosure if it found that the engaged
individuals were in a fiduciary relationship." Conventional con-
tract analysis, unlike the UPAA, would not require both show-
ings to hold the agreement unenforceable.
A third approach to premarital agreements does not treat
them significantly differently from other agreements. In a 1990
case, Simeone v. Simeone," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
changed its approach to reviewing premarital agreements, which
had been in line with the fairness approach.4 The court in
Simeone decided that the Pennsylvania courts no longer should
inquire into whether the terms of the premarital agreement
were fair or whether the parties had informed understandings of
the rights they were surrendering. These contracts would offer
scionability alone is insufficient to nullify a premarital agreement. In this respect,
the commissioners diverged not only from the common law of antenuptial agree-
ments but also from general contract principles." (footnote omitted)).
Two matters of elaboration are relevant: first, some states have modified the
UPAA in the process of adoption, making the adopted version less forgiving of un-
reasonable agreements. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36g (West 1998
Supp.). Under the Connecticut version of the UPAA, enforcement will be denied
under any of the following situations: there was an absence of voluntariness; the
agreement was unconscionable at the time of execution or the time of enforcement;
there was no "fair and reasonable disclosure"; or there was no reasonable opportuni-
ty to consult independent counsel. See id. Second, there is some anecdotal evidence
from practicing family lawyers that even when a state adopts the UPAA as written,
family court judges sometimes will not enforce it on its terms-for example, refusing
to enforce a one-sided agreement, even when there has been full disclosure. Also, a
court has the option of reading the UPAA requirement of voluntariness broadly,
thereby making the UPAA standard much stricter. See infra text accompanying
notes 146-69 for a related discussion under the rubric of duress.
39. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
40. 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990). Simeone has been discussed in a variety of different
ways over the years. See Recent Developments-Family Law, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1399, 1403-04 (1991) (using Simeone to support an approach to premarital agree-
ments in which courts treat them like "liquidated damages" provisions); Carol
Sanger, Feminism and Disciplinarity: The Curl of the Petals, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
225, 258-62 (1993) (suggesting that Simeone is a good case for teaching the influence
on doctrine of views regarding gender differences).
41. See, e.g., In re Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d 423, 428-29 (Pa. 1987).
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only the same defenses available for conventional contract agree-
ments, e.g., duress, unconscionability, and misrepresentation.42
The facts of Simeone are worth summarizing, for they are rep-
resentative of facts that often appear in reported decisions.43 At
the time of their 1975 marriage, Catherine Walsh Simeone was
a 23-year-old nurse and Frederick Simeone was a 39-year-old
neurosurgeon.' He had an income of approximately $90,000
per year and assets worth approximately $300,000, while she
was unemployed.45 On the eve of the wedding, his attorney pre-
sented her with a premarital agreement.4 6 The agreement stat-
ed that she would be limited to "support payments of $200 per
week in the event of separation or divorce, subject to a maxi-
mum total payment of $25,000."47 The couple separated in 1982
and divorced in 1984.48 By 1984, his payments to her had
reached the $25,000 maximum, and he ceased paying." She
then filed for alimony." The master's report rejected the claim
on the basis of the premarital agreement, and that report was
affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court.5 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, instead of evaluating the Superior Court's ap-
plication of the principles of prior cases, chose to reexamine, and
then to reform radically, those principles.52 The court argued
that the fairness approach required by earlier decisions was
grounded on paternalism, "a belief that spouses are of unequal
status and that women are not knowledgeable enough to under-
stand the nature of contracts that they enter," and that a justifi-
cation for such paternalistic beliefs no longer existed.53 The
court held that the same contractual principles that governed
42. See Simeone, 581 A.2d at 167. There also was a requirement of full and fair
disclosure, as discussed infra note 54 and accompanying text.
43. Of course, this is not to say that they necessarily are representative of the
usual fact situations of all premarital agreements, whether litigated or not.
44. See Simeone, 581 A.2d at 163.
45. See id.
46. See id.





52. See id. at 165.
53. Id.
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other commercial contracts between fiduciaries were also to
govern premarital agreements,5 4 and that under those princi-
ples the premarital agreement in question was valid.55
To summarize, divorce-focused premarital agreements regard-
ing the division of property and spousal support are now en-
forceable in almost every state.56 An almost even split among
the jurisdictions exists on the procedural and substantive fair-
ness elements of the agreements, with the slight majority proba-
bly willing to enforce with few or no requirements on those ele-
ments.57 The remaining jurisdictions are more willing to inval-
idate or modify agreements that have problems of substantive or
procedural fairness.58
B. Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage
Legal change is rarely simple, and unintended consequences
are probably the rule rather than the exception. Changes to the
regulation of an institution as central and pervasive as marriage
are likely to have repercussions far beyond the change effected.
An analysis Joseph Raz offered regarding same-sex marriage
54. The Simeone court noted that the parties in premarital agreements "do not
quite deal at arm's length" but rather "stand in a relation of mutual confidence and
trust," and therefore require a "full and fair" disclosure of financial resources "consis-
tent with traditional principles of contract law." Id. at 167 (quoting In re Estate of
Kaufmann, 171 A.2d 48, 51 n.8 (Pa. 1961)).
55. See Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165-66.
56. By most accounts, the last holdout against the enforceability of premarital
agreements was Nebraska, which allowed such agreements but limited their en-
forcement. See Busekist v. Busekist, 398 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Neb. 1987) (holding that
court not bound by terms of agreement and that the agreement was simply evidence
as to what amount court should award); see also 2 SCHLISSEL ET AL., supra note 12,
§ 15A.02, at 311 n.7 (describing Nebraska as the last state to refuse full en-
forcement to such agreements). That Nebraska decision, however, may have been
superseded by the adoption in that state of the UPAA. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-
1001-42-1011 (1996) (effective March 1994). Schlissel notes Nebraska's adoption of
the UPAA, but draws no significance from it. See 2 SCHLISSEL ET AL., supra note 12,
at 487 app. II.
57. See supra note 34 and text accompanying notes 34-39 (stating that 26 juris-
dictions have adopted the UPAA, which leans strongly toward enforcement); see also
supra text accompanying notes 40-55 (summarizing Simeone, which set the strong
pro-enforcement standard in Pennsylvania).
58. See notes 28-32 and accompanying text (summarizing the approach of jurisdic-
tions, other than Pennsylvania, that have not adopted the UPAA and citing example
cases).
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exemplifies such repercussions: when homosexuals ask for the
right to marry,59 they are asking to participate in a particular
social good that this society has to offer.6" It also is the case,
however, that at whatever point homosexuals are allowed to
marry, that will change the social good; it will change the way
we think about marriage.6' Perhaps then society will view mar-
riage primarily or paradigmatically as a matter of the public
commitment of intimate friends to each other, rather than a
matter of the foundation for raising a family.62 How we then
would think about marriage and about the myriad legal conse-
quences of marriage might change in significant ways."
Those who opposed the Irish Referendum of 1995, which
changed the Irish Constitution to allow divorce, raised a similar
argument." The "no" campaigners argued that the availability
of divorce necessarily would change the nature of marriage, pre-
sumably for the worse, both for those who would marry subse-
quent to the change and for those who had married earlier.65
59. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 49 (Haw. 1993).
60. See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF
LAW AND POLITIcS 23 (1994).
61. See id.
62. The argument, though, sometimes works the other way. Advocates for same-
sex marriage frequently ground their arguments on the fact that many same-sex
couples are raising biological, adopted, or foster children, and therefore should be
given the same benefits and the same recognition as different-sex couples who are
trying to raise a family. See generally Charles J. Butler, Note, The Defense of Mar-
riage Act: Congress's Use of Narrative in the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage, 73
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 841, 868 (1998) (noting that in the late 1980s, approximately three
million gays and lesbians in the United States were parents, and between eight and
ten million children were being raised in gay or lesbian households).
63. Some commentators argue that same-sex marriages will work to undermine
gender roles within traditional marriages and related notions of patriarchy or male
supremacy. See, e.g., Jordan Herman, Comment, The Fusion of Gay Rights and Fem-
inism: Gender Identity and Marriage After Baehr v. Lewin, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 985,
998 (1995) ("[F]eminists recently adjudged in the gay rights movement a potential to
break down the static and sexist definitions of marriage and family.").
64. The referendum took place on November 24, 1995, and was carried by a slim
margin. See Christopher Price, Comment, Finding Fault with Irish Divorce Law, 19
LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 669, 669 (1997). The referendum authorized legislation
under which a court could grant a divorce if the couple had lived apart for four of
the previous five years. See id. at 681-82 (presenting the text of the constitutional
amendment). After a legal challenge to the referendum failed, the Family Law (Di-
vorce) Act was published in June 1996. See id. at 680-83.
65. See John Finlay, A Statement of the Case AGAINST the Proposed Amendment
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These examples indicate that, in considering legal reforms to
premarital agreements, two separate considerations may be rele-
vant: (1) the approach to the enforceability or review of premari-
tal agreements that current views of marriage will support; and
(2) how particular responses to the questions of the enforceabil-
ity or review of these agreements will affect the way society
thinks about marriage."
A few caveats are necessary before going further down this
speculative trail. First, legal commentators must be careful and
somewhat skeptical in referring to the equities of various kinds
of agreements, the current "reality" about some institution, or
the use of the law to reform that reality. The analysis naturally
presupposes that they know far more about the social situation
than they probably do."7 This likely is the case with marriage
and with premarital agreements, where empirical work on atti-
tudes and practices is fairly sparse. To be sure, the argument
from lack of empirical knowledge supports both action and re-
straint. The argument for restraint is straightforward: if one
does not know the nature of the practice, one has little idea of
whether one's "solutions" are needed, and even less notion of
what effects one's reforms might have. On the side of action, one
could argue that because there is so little information about the
general "practice" of premarital agreements, it is almost hope-
less to try to modify behavior directly through the law, and all
to Article 41.3.2 of the Constitution (visited Apr. 30, 1998) <http://nis.rtc-tallaght.ie/
sig/law.home/divorce2.html> ("Divorce would change the legal basis of all marriages.
The law would no longer define marriage as a lifelong commitment. This would un-
dermine, destabilize and devalue marriage, contrary to the [Irish] constitutional
guarantee by the State to protect the family and the instituion [sic] of marriage.").
The Ad Hoc Commission on Referendum Information in 1995 supervised the prepara-
tion of this document, as well as the statement of the case "for" the amendment,
also available at the same Internet site. See id.
66. It is important to distinguish two separate, if overlapping inquiries: the way
certain legal rules may affect the way society perceives a practice or a social institu-
tion, and the way that the rules may affect the way society acts within that practice
or institution (e.g., by creating incentives and disincentives for various actions).
67. Karen Gross made a similar comment regarding bankruptcy law: "As remark-
able as it may seem to nonlawyers and many nonbankruptcy lawyers, we have de-
veloped a personal bankruptcy system based principally on who we imagine individu-
al debtors and their creditors to be, while remaining remarkably ignorant about who
they really are." Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of
Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1513 (1990) (footnote omitted).
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one can reasonably hope to do is to make symbolic state-
ments-for or against a certain view of marriage-with the mere
possibility that such statements might have indirect and long-
term effects on behavior. Agnostic on the real-world effects, one
focuses on symbolic statements and chooses those that fit one's
political morality.
Some might argue that the "normal," deferential enforcement
of premarital contracts reflects the "current reality" of marriage
in some parts of America-that marriage is less a commitment
for life, and more a kind of serial monogamy.6" Assuming that
this argument has merit, the question it raises is what vision of
marriage, either actual or aspirational, is expressed when courts
are willing to enforce such agreements, but with significant re-
view of procedural and substantive fairness. It may be that here
the court in Simeone was right, in that it is hard to justify the
fairness approach except as a statement that these agreements
often involve weaker parties that, as a class, require the protec-
tion of the courts.
The image of marriage that one might take from Simeone as
well as from the UPAA approach to premarital agreements,
which similarly creates a substantial presumption of enforceabil-
ity, is one of an institution subject to substantial private order-
ing,"9 and one which people enter realizing that it may very
well not be "until death," with nearly as many marriages ending
in failure as in success.70
This leads back to the most basic question: How do we-as
individuals-view marriage? And how should we-through the
state, through law-view marriage? Some people have a tenden-
cy to deny that marriage is, or should be, about anything other
than love or the desire to raise a family. Other people have a
tendency to deny that marriage is about anything other than
68. See Schultz, supra note 2, at 249-50 (arguing for greater private ordering be-
cause of the "temporary" and "conditional" nature of modern marriage).
69. To clarify: With courts reluctant to interfere in what occurs on a day-to-day
basis within intact families, there already is substantial de facto private ordering, in
the sense that the partners come to some understanding as to how they will live
together, and the state rarely intervenes. "Private ordering" in this context refers to
the ability of a couple to enter into an agreement that the state is willing to
enforce.
70. See Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 MIcH. J.L. RE-
FORM 217, 226 & n.34, 245 & n.101 (1990).
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maximizing utility, or the like. The prosaic facts likely are: (1)
that most marriages have, whether admitted or not, elements of
each (e.g., that a partner can offer security may be part of his or
her "romantic" allure); and (2) that the mixture of the romantic
and the practical/economical likely will vary not only from gen-
eration to generation, but also at any given time from one mar-
riage to the next, and even within a single marriage as the
partners' perceptions, needs, and values evolve.71
That marriage might mean quite different things to quite
different people may indicate that our laws should be similarly
flexible;7 2 that is, couples should be able to choose from a
"menu" of options, an argument considered in Section II.B.2.73
II. FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT
The comment for which the legal historian Sir Henry Maine is
most famous is: "We may say that the movement of the progres-
sive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Con-
tract."74 The idea is that while our rights and obligations once
largely derived from our "status" as members of a class, caste, or
ethnic group, or from a gender-defined role within an extended
family, in modern times more and more of our legal rights and
obligations are the result of private, voluntary agreements.75
Most would consider the move from "status" to "contract" "a
good thing." Few advocate a return to feudalism, with every man
71. See Carol Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and Do-
mestic Arrangements, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 777, 798-801 (discussing the historical work
of Lawrence Stone and the novels of Anthony Trollope to illustrate the way that the
emphases on romantic matters or practical matters may change over time); see also
ROBERT M. POLHEMUS, EROTIC FAITH: BEING IN LOVE FROM JANE AUSTEN TO D.H.
LAWRENCE (1990) (discussing the treatment of love in important fiction, considering
in passing the interweaving of practical concerns with romantic aspirations).
72. Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake state this argument well in Lifting the
Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, supra note 4, at 460-64.
73. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text; see also Jennifer Gerarda
Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex
Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 747-48 (1995) (offering an analogy between mar-
riage law and corporate law, with the argument that people should be able to "Vote
with their feet" between alternative legal packages); Mary Anne Case & Paul G.
Mahoney, The Role of the State in Corporations and Marriage 1-2, 18-20 (June 25,
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (making a similar argument).
74. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (Dorset Press 1986) (1861).
75. See ROGER COTrERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE 45-46 (1989).
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being stuck in the same socioeconomic group and profession as
his father, and women rarely having choices of any kind. Still,
some people take their enthusiasm for "contract" in stronger
doses than others. Some, including self-described libertarians
and many supporters of the law and economics movement, argue
that, barring "market failure," allowing private parties to order
their lives and their interactions as they see fit always will max-
imize individual autonomy and social welfare.76 Most people,
though, want the law to stop short of purely private ordering in
all matters all of the time, whether because they think "market
failure" is pervasive, or because they believe that there are so-
cial interests or interests in justice and fairness that occasional-
ly or frequently trump autonomy and individual gain."
Even contract law has not made it all the way "to Contract,"
in the sense that there are aspects of agreements that parties
may not agree to bypass or waive. For example, parties may not
agree to impose large penalties-amounts far beyond those need-
ed for compensation-in the case of nonperformance, 78 and they
may not waive the duty to act in good faith.79
76. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353-92
(1990) (discussing the basic precepts of economics and its strengths and weaknesses
when applied to non-market behavior and, in particular, law). Cf Ann Laquer Estin,
Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 989, 991-1086 (1995) (offering a good overview of the strengths and weak-
nesses of economic analysis in its application to family law issues).
77. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADiN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) (arguing
that allowing the private ordering by the market will, in many areas, lead to impor-
tant losses in dignity and equality); Estin, supra note 76, at 1016-22, 1036-52, 1074-
87 (summarizing some of the shortcomings of economic analysis when applied to
family law).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 ("Liquidated Damages and
Penalties"); U.C.C. § 2-718 (1989) ("Liquidation or Limitation of Damages; Deposits").
See generally Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role
of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 712-38 (1990) (arguing against the
possibility or desirability of a morally neutral "freedom of contract" approach); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Con-
tract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 109-13 (1989) (arguing that the common law is incon-
sistent in the freedom it gives parties on substantive terms, in contrast to the re-
strictions on the ability to bargain around remedial rules). But see Lake River Corp.
v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1985) (offering an economic
argument for enforcing "penalty clauses" when there is no inequality of bargaining
power).
79. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1989) ("[Tihe obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agree-
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Family law has not journeyed nearly as far toward complete
private ordering as contract law, though it does reflect in many
instances Maine's shift away from status rules.80 First, mar-
riage contains a much smaller set of rights and obligations than
it once did. Most obviously, the states have removed the vast
majority of stereotype-ridden, sex-based duties and obligations
under which, for example, a husband had an obligation to sup-
port his wife, and the wife was obligated to follow the husband's
choice of domicile."1 Second, no-fault divorce has given the par-
ment.'). More precisely, the parties can agree to such provisions, and even voluntar-
ily act in accordance with those agreements, but what the parties cannot do is get
the state to enforce such agreements if one party to the agreement does not act in
accordance with it.
80. For excellent discussions of the extent to which family law has moved "from
status to contract," see CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION
TO FAMILY LAw 307-98 (1996) ("The Vow and the Covenant: The Contractualization
of Family Law"); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L.
REv. 1443, 1446-70. This Article follows the unwritten requirement that, when dis-
cussing the contractual nature of marriage, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888),
must be cited and quoted:
[W]hile marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions of
courts as a civil contract, . . . it is something more than a mere contract.
The consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but
when the contract to marry is executed by marriage, a relation between
the parties is created which they cannot change.
Id. at 210-11.
On the topic of "status to contract" in marriage, one also can draw different
and more complicated pictures regarding the history of family law. Two examples
will suffice: First, some have argued that there is a largely contractual pre-history,
before state intervention transformed marriage into an almost entirely status-bound
relationship. See, e.g., Case & Mahoney, supra note 73, at 12-15; see also LAWRENCE
STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS AND BROKEN LIvES 20-25 (1995) (discussing "contract
marriage" in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, which sometimes
involved neither Church nor State). Case & Mahoney demonstrate that there was a
time when the State's role in marriage was quite limited. If one goes far enough
back into medieval history, there is some evidence that marriage was once "contrac-
tual" not only in the sense that the State was not directly involved in validating the
relationship, but also in the sense that the parties could establish or alter their
rights and duties as a married couple. See Case & Mahoney, supra note 73, at 22-
24. Second, John Witte, Jr. has shown the ways in which various religious views on
marriage have affected the development of marriage law, followed, only in the most
recent decades, with a sudden withdrawal from this approach to marriage: thus, not
"from status to contract" so much as "from sacrament to contract." See JOHN WITTE,
JR., FROM SACRAMENT To CONTRACT 194 (1997).
81. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 939-40 (E.D. Mich. 1940)
(discussing a range of sex-based limitations on married women).
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ties to a marriage substantial power to end the legal relation-
ship if they so choose, to the point that in many states the cur-
rent rules, as applied, give each spouse more or less a right to
divorce upon demand. 2
Remaining questions about the abilities of spouses to control
the terms of their own marriage relate to their ability to set
their obligations to one another during marriage and their abili-
ty to agree to the post-divorce consequences of their marriage.83
This Article does not discuss the first issue, that of agreements
setting or altering the obligations of spouses to one another,'
or altering the grounds for divorce.' Additionally, this Article
does not discuss in detail the extent to which the metaphor of
contract is helpful or unhelpful in understanding the current
rules regarding marriage and divorce.86 Even as to agreements
82. The extent to which this is true varies considerably from state to state. There
appear to be three states where divorce is possible only with the cooperation or con-
sent of the other party unless fault is shown. See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr,
Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault
Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719, 723 & n.8 (summarizing the divorce rules in New
York, Mississippi, and Tennessee).
83. Elhman and Lohr suggest that marriage might be analogous to a long-term
contract between commercial parties "where the standard of performance cannot be
adequately specified by contract," and the problems arising from that fact are com-
pensated for by "specify[ing] instead the consequences of termination." Ellman &
Lohr, supra note 82, at 747. If the state's rules regarding alimony and property divi-
sion can be thought of in these terms, an express premarital agreement obviously
would fit the analogy even better.
For a provocative analysis of marriage within the context of game theory and
social norms, see Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND
RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., forthcoming 1998).
84. Regarding agreements entered into prior to marriage or during marriage that
concern behavior during the course of the marriage, see supra note 12. Courts are
probably least likely to enforce agreements covering either daily/mundane or intimate
aspects of marriage, but such agreements may have benefits for the marriage re-
gardless of the prospects of later legal enforcement. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN,
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 225-333 (1981) (discussing the benefits of "intimate con-
tracts" and offering examples of such agreements).
85. See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 4, at 464-69. For an argument that agree-
ments requiring or favoring fault-based approaches when parties divorce should be
enforceable, see Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual
Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 879, 906-11 (1988).
86. For an excellent analysis of this issue, see Ellman & Lohr, supra note 82, at
737-47. One of Ellman and Lohr's basic points is that it is hard to understand ali-
mony as the "remedy" for a "breach" of the marriage "contract," because the "terms"
of any such contract are not set with sufficient clarity by either the State or the
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regarding post-divorce consequences of marriage, one must sepa-
rate out agreements entered into when the process of dissolution
is already underway. Courts have a strong tendency to enforce
these "separation" agreements, barring a showing of unconscio-
nable terms, duress, fraud, or the like-the types of arguments
that also would block the enforcement of standard commercial
contracts.87 In contrast to divorce-focused premarital agree-
ments, which likely occur in only a small percentage of marriag-
es, separation agreements are very common.88 The two types of
agreements are similar in that their terms provide for the pri-
vate ordering of the economic consequences of divorce. They do,
however, have some important differences. The frequent use of
separation agreements means that the proposal of such an
agreement is less likely to come as a surprise to one of the par-
ties. In addition, the incongruity between content and timing in
premarital agreements, which requires thinking about divorce at
the beginning of the marriage when things are, one hopes, going
well, contrasts with the fact that separation agreements involve
thinking about divorce when it is clearly imminent.89
As for attempts to set the post-divorce terms in advance, the
particular focus of this Article is agreements entered into just
before marriage. In theory, spouses also could enter into such
agreements early in their marriage-after the ceremony but long
before divorce seems likely-although courts apparently have
not encountered such attempts frequently. 0
parties. See id.
87. See, e.g., Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements:
A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1444 (1984).
88. As noted earlier, little hard empirical data is available, see supra note 15 and
accompanying text, so all generalizations in this area will be somewhat speculative
and overly dependent on anecdote and non-scientific observation.
89. Consider, by way of analogy, the old common law rule that agreements to ar-
bitrate current disputes were enforceable, but agreements to arbitrate future disputes
were not. See, e.g., Wells v. Mobile County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 387 So. 2d 140,
144-45 (Ala. 1980) (applying common law rule and refusing to enforce an agreement
to arbitrate future disputes); William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial
Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 194, 218 (refer-
ring to a 1920 New York statute that made agreements to arbitrate future disputes
enforceable).
90. For a discussion of how the law might be different with respect to the division
of property upon death or divorce when parties enter into agreements other than
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In principle, one could go very far toward a purely private
ordering of intimate relationships.9' In fact, Martha Fineman
has already advocated such a scheme, proposing the abolition of
marriage as a state institution, with all intimate associations
governed by private contracts instead.92 While few might sup-
port the call for abolishing marriage, there are many who might
support substantial private ordering within marriage. The argu-
ment is straightforward: marriage is to a large extent a private
matter between the people involved. Why should the two indi-
viduals not have the right to construct the factual, moral, and
legal contours of their marriage relationship as they see fit? As-
suming that such private ordering stays well clear of violence,
abuse, or exploitation, the argument would continue that it is no
separation agreements during marriage, see 3 ALEXANDER LINDEY & LOUIS PARLEY,
LINDEY ON SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENupTiAL CONTRACTS ch. 91 (1997)
("Postnuptial Agreements"); Jeanne K. Stretch, Premarital Agreements and
Postmarital Agreements Enforced at Death, in PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRACTS
161-94 (Edward L. Winer & Lewis Becker eds., 1993).
91. It may be worth noting that the parties to a marriage are always free to or-
der their lives as they see fit, within the wide boundaries of tort and criminal law,
as long as it is done with the cooperation of both parties. The question is always
"only" whether the State will intervene to enforce an agreement at the point when
the parties (or their agents, if one of the parties is deceased) are no longer volun-
tarily abiding by the agreement. In the classic case of Graham v. Graham, the
court, in considering an agreement by which the husband agreed to accompany his
wife on her travel in return for an agreement of monthly payment, stated:
There is no reason, of course, why the wife cannot voluntarily pay her
husband a monthly sum or the husband by mutual understanding quit
his job and travel with his wife. The objection is to putting such conduct
into a binding contract, tying the parties' hands in the future and invit-
ing controversy and litigation between them.
Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 939 (E.D. Mich. 1940).
92. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMI-
LY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER]; Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract, Marriage and Background
Rules, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 183, 185-88 (Brian Bix
ed., 1998) [hereinafter Fineman, Contract]. Professor Fineman has summarized her
position as follows:
I suggest that all relationships between adults be nonlegal and, therefore,
nonprivileged-unsubsidized by the state. In this way, "equality" is
achieved in regard to all choices of sexual relational affiliations. I suggest
we destroy the marital model altogether and collapse all sexual relation-
ships into the same category-private-not sanctioned, privileged, or pre-
ferred by law.
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra, at 5.
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business of the state that the terms are of one kind rather than
another.9 3 Statutes and old, but apparently still valid, court
decisions that make sexual relations outside of marriage illegal
or penalize children born outside of wedlock still exist in most
states, but courts rarely enforce them, and for the vast majority
of people they have few real-world effects.94 For most people in
most places there is no legal barrier to a couple ordering its inti-
mate relationship as it sees fit. A couple may still face social
sanctions for cohabitation and raising children outside of mar-
riage, but these too vary substantially from place to place and
from family to family.95
One argument sometimes raised against a private ordering
approach is that a contractual approach creates a bias toward
individualism, when there are good reasons for wanting to en-
courage altruism in relationships generally, and especially in
marriage and families." Whatever the merits of this argument
as a general claim, in the context of current marriage and no-
fault divorce law, contracts can be a useful means for a couple
who want to make a greater commitment to each other, and who
want to create greater incentives for altruistic behavior. Pro-
93. If the sympathetic way of putting the argument is that marriages should be
subject to the private ordering of the people involved, the unsympathetic way of
characterizing the same position is that marriage should be subject to market forces.
See discussion infra notes 13843 and accompanying text.
94. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S
SEX LAws 98-102 (1996) (summarizing the statutes, if any, relating to "fornication"
in each state and under federal law).
95. On the other hand, one might ask: If marriage were completely subject to pri-
vate ordering, from the obligations of the spouses to one another during marriage to
their obligations after dissolution, what interest would couples have in entering such
a status, and what interest would the state have in creating or maintaining such a
status?
In an unpublished manuscript, Eric Posner makes a similar point from the con-
verse perspective. The rules prohibiting extramarital sex and sanctioning illegitimate
births can be a means of encouraging people to make the costly commitment of tra-
ditional fault marriage. Where the social and legal sanctions against substitutes for
legal marriage have decreased, it is not surprising that the commitment costs of
marriage have been reduced, for example, through easier, no-fault exit, and vice
versa. See Posner, supra note 83 (manuscript at 21-26, on file with author).
96. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 2, at 24142 (summarizing the argument).
97. This paragraph follows the argument of Rasmusen and Stake, supra note 4, at
466-69. For a provocative argument that laws should help foster a return to "status,"
and, through that return, encourage a greater degree of intimacy and commitment
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ponents of private ordering argue that easy-exit divorce laws
have the effect of rewarding parties who invest in human capi-
tal, such as their career or job skills, both of which are easily
transferable after termination of the marriage, while creating a
disincentive to investing in the relationship by acquiring abili-
ties and various forms of knowledge that may improve the cur-
rent relationship but may have little transfer value in a relation-
ship with someone else or in a work context. Thus, couples who
want to encourage more altruistic and relationship-centered
behavior rationally might choose to enter private agreements
waiving their rights to a no-fault divorce.
One hypothetical situation that tests the contractual/libertar-
ian approach involves a couple in which one person, for some
reason, refuses to get married without a premarital agreement.
For present purposes, assume that the person insists upon an
unreasonable one-sided agreement. The other party, though un-
happy about the agreement, would rather be married with the
agreement than not married without the agreement. Does soci-
ety tell this couple that it will not give them the option of being
married with an enforceable agreement, even though that would
be their preference?98
within families, see MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF IN-
TIMACY 118-53 (1993); see also Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (1994) (reviewing REGAN, supra, and suggesting the con-
nection of Regan's "status" analysis to a "covenant" model of marriage).
98. The court in Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 163 (Pa. 1990), touched on this is-
sue: "By invoking inquiries into reasonableness, however, the functioning and reli-
ability of prenuptial agreements is severely undermined. Parties would not have en-
tered such agreements, and, indeed might not have entered their marriages, if they
did not expect their agreements to be strictly enforced." Id. at 166.
Katharine Silbaugh offers an interesting argument for not enforcing premarital
agreements: Because premarital (and marital) agreements covering nonfinancial as-
pects of marriage and divorce are not enforceable, and Silbaugh agrees that there
are good reasons for not enforcing those types of agreements, "the demands of equal-
ity suggest that we should at least have a presumption against the enforcement of
monetary contracts." Katharine Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Econo-
my, 93 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 4, on file with author).
Much of Silbaugh's analysis turns on the argument that it is important to treat the
monetary and nonmonetary aspects of marriage equally. See id. at 53-66. For her
argument to succeed, she needs the further conclusion that it is important to treat
the monetary and nonmonetary aspects of divorce similarly. Premarital agreements
are enforceable only as to the monetary aspects of divorce and unenforceable as to
169
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:145
This argument tracks other comparable fact situations. For
example, there are merchants who would not sell to the poor if
they were not able to impose relatively high interest payments
or fairly severe sanctions for nonpayment of installments.99 If
the disadvantaged party in the premarital agreement preferred
marriage under oppressive terms to not marrying at all, just as
the poor person might prefer purchase under oppressive terms to
not having the opportunity to purchase, why should the state
intervene?"'
This Article does not mean to endorse the view that legal and
moral inquiry should begin and end with the question of con-
sent.1"' As Robin West has argued, participation in an activity
the nonmonetary aspects, for example, child custody. See supra note 12. This second
conclusion may or may not follow from the first. Silbaugh also offers responses to
the argument that refusing to enforce premarital agreements might prevent some
marriages: (1) she doubts that enforcement would in fact prevent many marriages;
(2) she points out that a comparable argument might be made regarding marriages
prevented by nonenforcement of nonmonetary agreements; and (3) she suggests that
no great harm would come from preventing such marriages. See id. at 91-93. Those
responses are worth serious consideration, though they may not be entirely dispos-
itive. A possible libertarian reply is that Silbaugh's equality argument could support
an argument for greater enforcement of nonmonetary agreements as long as the
agreements, as always, took sufficient care to minimize third-party effects such as
bad effects on children. One could argue, for example, that courts should enforce
premarital agreements regarding child custody, except where a court finds that en-
forcement would significantly harm the children. This arguably is what happens now
with separation agreements in which the divorcing parties agree on child custody
arrangements.
99. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447-48 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (holding that cross-collateral clauses in the sale of goods may be subject to a
defense of unconscionability); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reap-
praisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 306-08 (1975) (arguing that such clauses are defensi-
ble on economic grounds and that courts should enforce them).
100. One's attitude toward the issues in this line of questioning may depend on
one's beliefs about the items in question. One may want to insist on the availability
of furniture, or large appliances, or even television sets, to the poor on fair
terms-and, the argument might go, to make them available at all requires making
them available on one-sided terms-because one believes that people need these
goods to live a dignified life in today's society. Some people would make a similar
claim about the role of marriage. There are other people who would find that sort of
claim for marriage absurd. It is exactly such diverging views concerning the role and
meaning of marriage in society that makes legislative and judicial prescriptions
about family law so difficult.
101. See infra notes 146-69, 190-218, 234-40, and accompanying text for discussions
of this extremely difficult and multi-faceted problem.
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(e.g., pornography, surrogacy, prostitution) may be extremely
harmful even though fully consensual, and the harm may be of
the magnitude necessary to justify state intervention in some
form:
10 2
The liberal insistence that these transactions are problem-
free because consensual does little but assume away a set of
harms, and the radical insistence that because they are
harmful they must therefore be subtly coercive, even when
seemingly consensual, does little but give offense to the work-
er or the woman whose competency is thereby challenged. 3
Another part of the problem is that for every person who makes
choices of this kind,' 4 fully aware of what he or she is giving
up and freely choosing to do so for whatever benefits may seem
to come from the choice, there will be many others who act in
ways that are less free, knowing, or autonomous.
Additionally, one could argue that sometimes restricting choic-
es, while decreasing the welfare of the choosers in the short
term, may lead to longer-term gains in welfare. Forbidding child
labor had the effect in the short term of making matters harder
for the families of children who could have been bringing needed
money to the household. In the longer term, however, the prohi-
bition probably worked to hasten the development of free public
education and other child welfare provisions, which increased
the overall welfare of the families in question.0 5 This, howev-
er, is a hard argument to make at the best of times, and it is not
obvious how the nonenforcement of premarital agreements is
likely to lead to, or be an integral part of, a similar political dy-
namic bringing about the betterment of those initially made
worse off by the reduction of choice.0 6
102. See Robin West, The Other Utilitarians, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW EssAYs IN
LEGAL THEORY 197, 220 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
103. Id.
104. For example, to accept a premarital agreement, to take on a job conventionally
thought to be degrading, to play a movie role conventionally thought to be demean-
ing, or to sell sexual services or a body part.
105. See Michael J. Trebilcock, Critiques of The Limits of Freedom of Contract: A
Rejoinder, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 374-75 (1995).
106. See id. at 375-76.
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The analysis returns, inevitably, to the question of the state
interest in marriage, in wanting couples married rather than
unmarried and in wanting marriages to be of a particular form.
One also can ask the question from the other side: What is the
interest couples have in being married if they are able to shape
their relationship as they wish when they remain unmarried?
The state shows its preference for the married state over the
unmarried state by offering certain benefits to married couples
that unmarried couples do not get or can get only with difficulty,
including health benefits, survivorship rights, and rights to
make health care decisions on behalf of the other partner. 7
This in turn also gives one of the more prosaic reasons couples
choose to marry-to obtain those benefits. Another reason par-
ties marry is that their own beliefs or the beliefs of their com-
munity involve significant social sanctions against unmarried
couples and/or the children of unmarried couples.
Many individuals, including the same-sex couples litigating
for the right to marry, clearly seem to want marriage for its own
sake, beyond whatever monetary or "practical" benefits may
come from that status and beyond simple questions of family or
community approval. Part of the value of marriage is the public
commitment involved and the community support that mobilizes
to support the marriage relationship. Even beyond that, mar-
riage has a positive social meaning and an attractiveness as an
institution. One wonders, however, whether the social meaning
of marriage just might be the residue of a time when marriage
had greater significance because of the social and legal sanctions
for sexual relations or having children outside of marriage.
Returning to the State's side of the equation, one characteriza-
tion of the State's interest in marriage is that it has an interest
in promoting stable family units of a certain kind, which argu-
ably provide the best atmosphere within which to raise children
and which arguably contribute to general social stability. A more
cynical view of state interest captures an aspect of the historical
explanation as well as an aspect of the present reality. To this
107. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58-59 (Haw. 1993) (discussing such benefits
as one reason why same-sex couples would want to marry).
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view, marriage is not about the altruistic and romantic union of
two people, nor is it about the private ordering of two hyper-
rational bargainers. Rather, it is about protecting established
families and their property. Historically, the public aspect of
marriage-requiring public registration and ceremony before
someone with delegated public power-was motivated in large
part by the desire of wealthy families to prevent their children
from making secret marriage contracts with attractive but "un-
suitable" members of a lower class.' Premarital agreements
imposed by the family of someone about to be married for the
purpose of keeping wealth within the family reflect this same
pragmatic view of marriage.
Another obvious sense in which marriage is not just a private
matter between the parties involved is that it often involves
children. In principle, premarital agreements should have little
effect on children, as the agreements are not enforceable on is-
sues of child custody and child support,"9 and enforcement of
the state child support guidelines should guard children of di-
vorced parents from economic harm. With non-custodial parents
often failing to live up to their child support obligations, howev-
er, the fact that the custodial parent receives less property or
spousal support than he or she otherwise might will have obvi-
ous implications for the child's well-being. Similarly, the arrival
of children in a family may lead the financially weaker spouse to
abandon or de-emphasize his or her career, a move that could
well exacerbate the post-divorce effects-on both the financially
weaker spouse and, derivatively, the children of the mar-
riage-of rights waived under the agreement.
A. Separation Agreements Versus Premarital Agreements
One way to try to pinpoint the source of society's discomfort
with enforcing some or all premarital agreements is to contrast
this with reactions to separation agreements, which the courts
have been traditionally more likely to accept and enforce as
written. In cases where the spouses enter an agreement with a
108. See STONE, supra note 80, at 32-34.
109. See supra note 12.
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view to divorce, and the provision for the poorer or weaker
spouse over time turns out to be clearly inadequate, should the
courts consider ignoring, invalidating, or modifying the agree-
ment?".. In one such case, a Canadian court awarded an es-
tranged wife permanent maintenance, but she subsequently
agreed to a one-time lump sum payment in lieu of mainte-
nance."' Fifteen years later, the former wife had exhausted
the funds she received and was living at the poverty level."1
Meanwhile, her former husband had become quite wealthy.13
The former wife sought an order of spousal support despite her
earlier agreement to waive her rights to support, and the Cana-
dian Supreme Court refused her request on the basis of the
earlier agreement."' Other Canadian cases have come out the
other way, with courts refusing to enforce separation agreements
by which one party waived rights to support when they found
that subsequent developments were not in the contemplation of
the parties when they signed the agreement."5
To the extent that one's reaction to a separation agreement
that works out poorly for one party is the same or different from
one's reaction to the premarital agreement that works out poorly
for one party, one can gain evidence as to whether it is the pecu-
liar premarital nature of the latter which raises the question or
one's view about the obligations of spouses to one another, re-
gardless of agreements voluntarily entered before, during, or
after marriage. One may argue that in situations where one
spouse has invested so much of his or her life into a marriage,
and, not coincidentally, into supporting the other spouse's ability
to advance in his or her career, it is unfair for that spouse to be
left worse off while the prosperous spouse thrives, regardless of
agreements once entered."6 The argument hinges on a non-
110. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From
Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1242-44, 1270-76 (1998) (discussing separation agreements).
111. See Pelech v. Pelech [1987] 7 R.F.L. (3d) 225, 225.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 225-26.
115. See, e.g., Santosuosso v. Santosuosso [1997] 27 R.F.L. (4th) 234 (awarding
spousal support despite the wife's agreement to waive her rights to support).
116. See Hadfield, supra note 110, at 1243, 1271-76 (offering similar arguments in
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waivable duty arising from a combination of the nature of the
relationship and the actual sacrifices made.
Occasions exist when the argument for enforcing the premari-
tal agreement might be stronger than for enforcing a separation
agreement. For example, one of the parties might have relied on
the enforceability of the premarital agreement in his or her
decision to marry, a reliance arguably more substantial than any
reliance likely involved in entering separation agreements." 7
The question then becomes whether this argument of reliance is
enough to overcome claims of non-waivable duties.
B. Some Middle Paths
Middle path approaches to regulating marriage and divorce
attempt to bridge private ordering and full state regulation.
These include treating state rules as default rules around which
individuals can contract and having the state offer couples a list
of options from which they must select one.
1. Default Rules and Reasonableness
Contract law, in particular Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, offers examples of how a set of rules can respect indi-
vidual choice while also encouraging fair outcomes and express-
ing public policy. Allowing contracting parties the authority to
set their own terms on most issues accomplishes this goal. De-
fault rules prevail if the parties are silent, but the parties can
"contract around" these rules by express terms in an agree-
ment."8 These default rules usually reflect either the terms
parties most likely would choose in any event-and therefore the
ones that are most likely to reflect particular parties' actual
intentions-or the terms considered fairest to the parties."9
the context of separation agreements).
117. In such cases, the reliance will be more along the lines of litigating or not
litigating a claim regarding property division or spousal support.
118. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-308 (place for delivery), 2-309 (time for shipment; termi-
nation), 2-310 (time of payment), 2-509 (risk of loss) (1989). For a provocative argu-
ment that, in practice, the U.C.C. default rules operate more like quasi-compulsory
norms, see Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Sup-
plementation, 97 COLUMI. L. REV. 1710, 1755-59 (1997).
119. Among the extensive commentaries on the nature and purpose of default rules
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Second, the law establishes presumptions in favor of certain
understandings of provisions-usually understandings likely to
be fairer to the weaker party-when the contract is ambiguous,
but again allows agreements on contrary terms if the agreement
clearly expresses those terms."'
The connection between this approach to contracts and the
regulation of premarital agreements is as follows: When some
state laws and some commentators argue that the enforceability
of premarital agreements should turn on the substantive fair-
ness of the terms of each agreement, how does one determine
whether the substantive terms are reasonable? One could argue
that the state may justify intrusive forms of review because of
its interest in maintaining its rules and standards for property
division upon separation and divorce. This, however, requires
are: Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (advocating the use of "penalty" de-
faults, for which the parties would not have contracted, to force parties to reveal
beneficial information to each other or to third parties); Charles J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985) (arguing that ratio-
nal actors would prefer default rules that maximize the joint benefits from contract-
ing); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) (claiming that
courts are usually correct in not supplying terms to incomplete contracts, including
incomplete relational contracts and that the incompleteness often is caused by asym-
metrical information, and thus there are no problems that the courts could solve by
supplying terms).
The statement in the text is, at best, incomplete. Sometimes, there are other
reasons for choosing a default rule. Ayres and Gertner argue that there are occa-
sions when the default rule chosen should not be the one that most parties would
have chosen ("the majoritarian default rule") or even the one that these particular
parties would have chosen ("an optimally tailored default rule"), but rather one that
will enhance efficiency by forcing the parties to contract expressly over an issue. See
Ayers & Gertner, supra, at 101-04. Also, sometimes there might be reasons for hav-
ing the default rule be a "muddy" standard, allowing parties to contract around it to
form a bright-line rule, or to have the default rule impose more stringent obliga-
tions, allowing parties to contract around it to form a less stringent obligation. See,
e.g., Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook
and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1403-08 (1992) (book review) (discussing the
advantages of "muddy" default rules in corporate law).
120. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 227 (stating the presump-
tion, in some circumstances, against interpreting a term as a condition), 228 (stating
the presumption that a "satisfaction" clause should be understood in objective, not
subjective, terms) (1981).
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one to see state standards as a statement of what is reasonable,
and anything else as unreasonable or unjust, and one therefore
only should depart from those standards with great reluctance.
One could just as easily see current or future state standards
simply as default rules, as Calabresi and Melamed saw liability
rules.12' Only the parties can determine what constitutes a
reasonable settlement, and the default rule offers, at best, an
imperfect estimation for those occasions when the parties have
not or could not come to terms. The ideal solution, from a law
and economics perspective, is what in fact occurs in premarital
agreements: the parties themselves agree to a reasonable settle-
ment of their economic issues.'22 When the parties do not
agree, the state's ideas of fairness are used.
The above discussion, however, likely assumes roughly simi-
larly situated partners, who both might be considering the is-
sues surrounding the terms of dissolution. To the extent that
people have concerns about the enforcement of premarital agree-
ments, it is because of quite different scenarios-in particular,
those in which parties with great wealth, sophistication, and
bargaining power write agreements that "contract around" the
"default" terms.12
2. Menus of Options
An alternative frequently discussed among commentators in
recent years, which seems to offer a middle position between
purely private ordering in marriage and a strong state role, is
that of a "menu." Using this device, the State would set out a
series of options regarding roles within marriage, property rules
during marriage, property rules upon divorce or death, and so
on, from which each couple about to marry would have to choose
one. 24 Louisiana's recently enacted covenant marriage law
121. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1106-10.
122. The court in Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa. 1990), offered a sim-
ilar argument: "We are reluctant to interfere with the power of persons contemplat-
ing marriage to agree upon, and to act in reliance upon, what they regard as an
acceptable distribution scheme for their property." Id. at 166.
123. The author is grateful to Eric Posner for the point summarized in this para-
graph.
124. See Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
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does this on a small scale. 2 ' The Louisiana law requires cou-
ples marrying in that state to choose between a traditional mar-
riage, which would allow divorce on no-fault or fault grounds,
and a "covenant marriage," which would allow divorce usually
only on fault grounds.'26 Under the no-fault provisions, a cou-
ple may obtain a divorce after a separation of six months, or
immediately if one spouse is guilty of adultery or has been sen-
tenced to prison for a felony.'27 A covenant marriage would al-
low a divorce only if the couple had been separated for two
years,'28 or if one spouse is guilty of adultery, physical or sexu-
al abuse, or abandonment for at least a year. 9 As one com-
mentator stated, this "choice would almost certainly make for
some awkward premarital conversations.""'
The comparison with premarital agreements is obvious, but
the differences also are telling. The covenant marriage is a
choice imposed by the state, and all couples must face it. Also,
there are only two options, and they involve the availability of
Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1995, at 221; Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 4, at 460-64; Elizabeth S. Scott,
Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 85-86
(1990); Stake, supra note 8, at 429-37; Weisbrod, supra note 71, at 807-14.
125. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West 1998).
126. See id. § 9:307; see also Kevin Sack, Louisiana Approves Measure to Tighten
Marriage Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at Al. Already-married couples may
"convert" their marriages into covenant marriages by executing a declaration of in-
tent to that effect. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:275. For a good overview of the cov-
enant marriage law, the problems it was meant to address, and the new problems it
might create, see Margaret F. Brinig, The Marriage Covenant, in THE FALL AND
RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F. H. Buckley ed., forthcoming 1998).
127. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:275.
128. "Separation" in the above description means only "living separate and apart."
Id. § 9:307(A)(5). If a court had rendered a "judgment of separation from bed and
board," it would be sufficient grounds for divorce that the parties had been living
"separate and apart" for an additional year (one year and six months, if there were
minor children) beyond the date of the judgment of separation from bed and board.
Id. § 9:307(A)(6)(a),(b).
129. See id. § 9:307(B).
130. Sack, supra note 126, at Al. The early evidence is that few people are taking
up the "covenant marriage" option. See Bruce Nolan, Bishops Back Off Covenant
Marriage, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 30, 1997, at Al, available in 1997
WL 12674773 ("In the month after the law took effect Aug. 15, Louisiana officials
statewide issued only 26 covenant marriage licenses out of about 3,000.").
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divorce rather than the economic consequences of divorce. In
contrast with the proposals for "a menu of options," the covenant
marriage law has too few options, and covers too little legal
ground to be considered a meaningful reform.
3. Sunset Provisions
A proposal commentators have discussed informally on a num-
ber of occasions' 3' is that premarital agreements might seem
less problematic if there were a "sunset provision" that ended
the effectiveness of some or all of the agreement's provisions
once the marriage lasted a certain number of years or once chil-
dren were born. Legislation could implement such a provision,3 2
though of course the parties themselves would be free to insert
such terms within an agreement.'33
Sunset provisions offer a compromise between the interest in
private ordering and concerns about rationality--concerns which
grow .the longer a couple is married and the more their lives
change-and between the interest in private ordering and the
state interest that parties not be left destitute at the end of a
long marriage. While there are not many examples of similar
provisions in the law, the law of copyright, until recently, pro-
vided a right that automatically expired after a term of
years.
3 4
131. For example, the proposal was raised when an earlier version of this Article
was presented at Boston College Law School and at Quinnipiac College School of
Law.
132. Courts could in principle also create such rules as a matter of their common
law powers, but rules of that kind are not the ones that courts seem most comfort-
able in promulgating. Courts instead prefer talking of only enforcing "reasonable"
terms, or, to refer to the analogous problem of restrictive covenants, only enforcing
the covenant for a "reasonable" time.
133. See Edward L. Winer, Practical Considerations for Premarital Agreements, in
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRACTS 143-52 (Edward L. Winer & Lewis Becker
eds., 1993) (providing an example of a premarital agreement in which the parties
revert to statutory rules if the marriage lasts at least five years).
134. See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 4.10, at 4:187 (1998) ("[T]he 1976 Copy-
right Act [gave] authors and their statutory successors the nonwaivable right to
terminate copyright grants after the lapse of a prescribed period."). The prescribed
period varies depending on when the grant was executed. See id. (citing sections 203
and 304(c) of the 1976 Act).
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Like escalator clauses within premarital agreements,'35 sun-
set provisions might create unfortunate incentives for parties
otherwise uncertain about their marital future to act decisively
for divorce before the rights under the contract expire or
change.'36 It is possible, however, that courts could mitigate
this problem by using a "good faith" requirement and not giving




When activities or arrangements go from state prohibition or
state regulation to purely private ordering, the change often
raises concerns about the "commodification" of the activity or
arrangement in question. 3 To what extent does enforcement
of premarital agreements constitute a "commodification" of mar-
riage, or the entry of marriage into the market? The critics of
commodification generally assert that some things should not be
considered part of the market, and should not have a price tag
placed upon them."9 It is not coincidental that society consid-
ers something it values greatly to be "priceless" or "beyond
price."40 The non-commodification argument comes in different
135. See, e.g., Winer, supra note 133, at 147-48 (discussing form agreement with
provisions authorizing different levels of support if the marriage ended before two
years or between two and five years).
136. See, e.g., Bruce Weber, Donald and Marla Are Headed for Divestiture, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 1997, at 27 (reporting that Donald Trump divorced his second wife
when he did because of the timing of a sunset provision in their premarital agree-
ment).
137. Cf Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass.
1977) (holding that the termination of an at-will employee, apparently motivated by
the desire to deny the worker a commission arguably already "earned," was wrongful
because done in "bad faith").
138. See RADIN, supra note 77, at 1-15; Neil Duxbury, Do Markets Degrade?, 59
MOD. L. REV. 331, 331 (1996); see also JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
347-49 (1986) (noting that there are situations in which monetary valuation or mon-
etary substitution would seem inappropriate); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 785-90 (1994) (same).
139. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 138, at 347-49.
140. One also notes Oscar Wilde's definition of a cynic as someone "who knows the
price of everything, and the value of nothing." Oscar Wilde, Lady Windermere's Fan,
in THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST AND OTHER PLAYS 7, 45 (Peter Rahy ed.,
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forms. The most basic form holds that some items, such as ba-
bies or human organs, should not be sold. Others make the
slightly different argument that some items, such as one's liber-
ty, should not be alienable, and that others, such as services for
surrogacy or for arranging an adoption, though compensable,
should have strict constraints as to the terms of compensa-
tion.1
4 1
Premarital agreements do not raise the issue of "commodifi-
cation" in the way that prostitution, surrogacy agreements, or
the sale of human organs do, in that they involve no straight
purchase or market valuation of any service. They do evoke a
sense of an agreement likely, though not certainly, concerned
with monetary arrangements in an area in which society is
somewhat uncomfortable about negotiating over the monetary
terms. At the least, a background monetary issue exists in some
of these arrangements: unless one party agrees to waive part of
his or her rights to property and spousal support upon divorce,
the other party will refuse to marry. It becomes, in such circum-
stances, a question of how much money, discounted by time and
by contingency of divorce, this marriage is worth to the party to
whom the agreement is presented.
Mary Anne Case and Paul Mahoney summarize the argu-
ments regarding commodification briefly but succinctly. On one
side is the view that "it is unseemly to bargain about love"; on
the other side is the semi-economic claim "that couples may
have different preferences regarding how their lives will be
Oxford U. Press 1995) (1891).
141. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 77, at 20 (discussing the concept of "incomplete
commodification"); Duxbury, supra note 138, at 331.
142. Separation agreements, though they also are quite expressly agreements con-
cerning the division of assets, do not raise commodification questions in the same
way. In part, this is because the marriage, and presumably the love that once held
it together, is at that point past, and so one would not speak of those values being
commodified by a separation agreement. Additionally, separation agreements are sim-
ply the necessary disentangling of two lives which had, until then, been joined at
least to some extent by law, and usually to a great extent in fact. Separation agree-
ments are not seen as commodifications because no obvious alternative to having
such agreements-or similar divisions being done by the courts or by the operation
of law-seems workable.
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structured, and as between the state and the couple themselves,
many people would regard the couples as the ones better posi-
tioned to reach a mutually satisfactory accommodation of those
preferences."'43
Those with concerns about bargaining over the terms of mar-
iage or the terms of dissolution can hold resolutely to whatever
default rules their state provides and refuse to marry anyone
who will not marry without a premarital agreement, which may
not be bad advice in any event. To the extent that states get
around to a Louisiana-like result of having a menu of options
from which couples must choose, choice will no longer be avoid-
able, but it also may no longer have the same unpleasant social
meaning that premarital agreements now seem to carry for
many.
III. LONG-TERM AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS
A. Contractual Approaches: Old and New
When the court in Simeone and certain commentators advo-
cated applying the standards from contract law to premarital
agreements, they intended the agreements to be subject to mini-
mal scrutiny.'44 That perspective seems to depend, however, on
a view of contract law that is decades behind the developments
in contractual doctrine and commentary. 45 A modern approach
to contract law might reach results that, by enforcing some pre-
marital agreements but not others, better reflect the intuitions
of most people regarding the fair result in different cases. This
section first discusses the common law doctrine of duress and
how courts might use it to reach acceptable results in premarital
agreement cases without deviating in any significant way from
normal contract analysis. Second, this section considers how
143. Case & Mahoney, supra note 73, at 20. Case and Mahoney go on to note that
there may be a problem of third-party effects that could justify some greater state
role in setting possible agreement terms. See id. This, however, is different than
saying that such matters should not be subject to private ordering at all.
144. See Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165-68 (Pa. 1990).
145. A similar view is well-presented and discussed at greater length in Weisbrod,
supra note 71.
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some ideas from Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
might be helpful in construing premarital agreements, in partic-
ular the doctrine of "good faith." Additionally, the next part of
the Article considers the possibility of applying some ideas from
the treatment of relational contracts to this area.
1. Duress and Related Doctrines
It is quite possible that for many of the circumstances in
which intuition suggests that a court should not enforce a pre-
marital agreement, the fairly conventional contract analysis of
duress could justify such a conclusion. The Simeone case, dis-
cussed previously,46 is one case in which a judge or jury might
reasonably have used duress to refuse to enforce the agreement.
Another example involved the marriage of John and Christina
DeLorean. In that case, the premarital agreement provided that
all property and income acquired by each person before the mar-
riage and after the marriage would remain the separate proper-
ty of that person.'47 When the marriage ended 13 years later,
the parties' combined assets of over $20 million were almost all
in the husband's name.'48 The agreement had been presented
to the bride-to-be only hours before the wedding, with the threat
that the wedding would be canceled if she did not sign the
agreement. The case, however, had factors that may have
pointed away from a finding of duress: the bride-to-be had access
to an attorney, though one selected by the husband-to-be; 5 °
though the husband-to-be had much greater assets and business
experience, the bride-to-be had some experience in business;
and the bride-to-be had been through a prior marriage and
146. See supra text accompanying notes 40-55.
147. See DeLorean v. DeLorean, 511 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1986).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1258-59; cf Juliano v. Juliano, No. FA 94039973, 1997 Conn. Super.
Ct. LEXIS 2396, at *1 (Sept. 5, 1997) (discussing premarital agreement signed three
hours before the wedding and concluding, based on timing alone, that the agreement
was unenforceable because of coercion).
150. See DeLorean, 511 A.2d at 1259. Actually, the attorney advised against signing
the agreement. See id.
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divorce.15' The court in DeLorean decided to enforce the agree-
ment,'52 but a reasonable judge or jury could have come to a
contrary conclusion using the normal common law understand-
ings of duress and related doctrines.
In Ex parte Williams,'53 a woman, after discovering that she
was pregnant, had asked the father of the child to marry her.
Two months later, the father-to-be told the woman that he
would marry her only if she signed a premarital agreement.'
The woman signed the agreement and the parties were married,
but after seven years of marriage, the husband sued for divorce
and sought to enforce the premarital agreement.'55 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court, reversing summary judgment for the
husband, held that there remained genuine issues of material
fact regarding voluntariness and full disclosure. 55 As to the
former, the court characterized the issue as
whether the father's conditioning the marriage on the preg-
nant mother's signing the antenuptial agreement, joined with
the mother's moral objection to abortion and the importance
of legitimacy in a small town, created a coercive atmosphere
in which the mother had no viable alternative to accepting
the father's condition for marriage, i.e., signing the agree-
ment. 57
Richard Craswell, in his work on unconscionability, presents
one helpful way to articulate what is most bothersome about the
process behind many of the agreements in these cases.'
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1264.
153. 617 So. 2d 1032 (Ala. 1992).
154. See id. at 1034. The agreement stated that "in the event of legal termination
of the marriage, the wife is to receive $1,000 per year for each year that the parties
are married for a maximum of ten years." Id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1035.
157. Id.
158. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1993). Unconscionability, understood in
conventional ways, has and will continue to have significance, as courts use that
doctrine to invalidate the most egregiously one-sided premarital agreements. See,
e.g., DeLong v. DeLong, 1998 Mo. App. Ct. LEXIS 69, at *43-*45 (Jan. 20, 1998)
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Craswell borrows terminology from an earlier work by Calabresi
and Melamed 59 to offer a helpful clarification or proposed
modification of the way one thinks about questions of unconscio-
nability, duress, and related issues.6 ° Craswell casts the argu-
ment largely in terms of economic analysis and efficiency, 6'
but the point relevant to the present discussion can be made in
lay person's language. Craswell's analysis explains that when a
court is considering not enforcing a contractual term due to pro-
cedural or substantive unfairness, it should consider how such
unfairness most easily could be prevented.'62 Consider a con-
tract signed when one party had a gun pointed at his or her
head. The party effecting the coercion can avoid this type of
procedural inequity easily. The proper response by the courts
therefore is to refuse to enforce agreements reached in this un-
fair way in order to create a strong incentive for parties not to
reach agreements through coercion of this type.
A contrasting situation involves an insurance agreement with
many pages of exclusion clauses in small print, written in lan-
guage difficult to understand. Courts could conclude that the
insurance carrier has not obtained proper consent for these
clauses because the consumer did not fully understand the con-
tent of what she was signing."' One option would be for courts
to say that none of these clauses will be enforceable, unless the
carrier specifically drew the consumer's attention to the clauses
and explained them in terms that the consumer could under-
stand. The problem is that it might not be reasonable or
(invalidating on the basis of unconscionability a premarital agreement that excluded
the wife "from virtually all assets that the marriage would acquire").
159. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9.
160. See Craswell, supra note 158, at 15-63; Richard Craswell, Remedies When Con-
tracts Lack Consent: Autonomy and Institutional Competence, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
209, 214-21 (1995).
161. In particular, the article offered analysis in terms of whether entitlements are
protected by property rules or liability rules. When an entitlement is protected by
property rules, no infringement of the entitlement will be allowed without receiving
the consent of the entitlement holder. If, however, the entitlement is protected by a
liability rule, infringement of the entitlement will be allowed as long as damages are
paid.
162. See Craswell, supra note 158, at 8-12, 17-20.
163. See id. at 10-12.
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practical to demand this type of diligence on the part of insur-
ance companies; it might take days to explain all the terms of an
agreement. Where obtaining full and proper consent to contrac-
tual terms is not practical, an alternative is for the courts to say
that they only will enforce the terms to the extent that those
terms are reasonable." To the extent that the terms are not
reasonable, the courts will impute a reasonable term in place of
the unreasonable one.
This kind of analysis could be applied in the context of pre-
marital agreements by looking at these agreements, considering
what aspects of them are troubling, and determining whether it
would be better in the long term to offer the remedy of nonen-
forcement or the remedy of reasonable default provisions.'65 In
many cases, one party presents the agreement to the other on
the eve of marriage, with the condition that if he or she does not
sign it, the marriage is off.66 One could argue that, given the
social and emotional realities of such situations, this is coercion
that rises to the level of duress. If such a judgment is made, it is
important then to analyze how difficult it would be to prevent
this kind of coercion. Given that there usually would be no diffi-
culty in simply presenting the agreement to the other party at
an earlier time, the decision then should be that agreements
presented on the eve of marriage, with the threat of not going
through with the ceremony if the agreement were not signed,
would not be enforceable.
The presentation of a proposed agreement on the eve of mar-
riage also might raise the possibility of a defense of undue influ-
ence. Undue influence involves the combination of
overpersuasion by one party and vulnerability on the part of the
other.'67 A party often is vulnerable because of the emotional
164. See id.
165. On the treatment of state divorce rules as default provisions, see supra text
accompanying notes 118-23.
166. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 163 (Pa. 1990).
167. The classic case of undue influence is Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District,
54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966). In that case, a teacher had been arrested for
homosexual activity, and after he returned from arrest and interrogation, having had
little sleep for two days, he was confronted in his apartment by his principal and
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strain of an impending marriage, caused by both the event itself
and the stress that often comes with its planning. When, in this
situation, one learns that the premarital agreement must be
signed "right now" or the wedding is off, a strong argument for
undue influence is present.168
Parties to a premarital agreement easily can avoid the proce-
dural impropriety of presenting an agreement on the eve of mar-
riage, and courts might largely end the practice by adopting a
bright-line rule. If courts clearly state that they will not enforce
agreements presented at the last moment when they could have
been presented at an earlier time, such as two weeks-or two
months-before the wedding, the frequency of such practices
should diminish drastically.
Of course, this is not meant to overstate optimism regarding
bright-line rules.'69 The variety of fact situations in real cases
always will outrun bright-line rules set out to create and effect
the district superintendent. See id. at 537. They said that they had his best inter-
ests at heart, urged him to resign at once, warned him of the adverse consequences
if he did not resign, and told him that there was no chance to consult an attorney.
See id. at 537-38. The court concluded that the teacher could rescind the signed res-
ignation on the basis of undue influence. See id. at 543.
168. The court in Odorizzi listed seven elements that indicate overpersuasion:
(1) discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropriate time, (2)
consummation of the transaction in an unusual place, (3) insistent de-
mand that the business be finished at once, (4) extreme emphasis on un-
toward consequences of delay, (5) the use of multiple persuaders by the
dominant side against a single servient party, (6) absence of third-party
to the servient party, [and] (7) statements that there is no time to con-
sult financial advisers or attorneys.
Id. at 541. Many of these factors, if not all of them, may be present when a pre-
marital agreement is presented at a late date.
169. For one argument in favor of bright-line rules in this area, see Gant v. Gant,
329 S.E.2d 106, 115 (W. Va. 1985):
In crafting rules in an area such as the enforcement of prenuptial agree-
ments only one thing is certain: no matter what rules we adopt there
will be cases when the application of those rules will be inequitable.
Therefore, the question to be asked is whether the adoption of firm rules
making prenuptial agreements presumptively enforceable in their stated,
explicit terms will advance or undermine legitimate public policy that
favors marriage. In the field of prenuptial agreements, firm rules favoring
enforceability inevitably further the public policy of encouraging middle
aged, cohabiting couples to regularize their relationships by getting
married.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
fair results. For example, if the rule provides that a premarital
agreement will not be enforceable if it is presented for the first
time merely days before the ceremony, a case likely would arise
in which the parties discussed the agreement, at greater or less-
er length and in greater or lesser detail, months before, but it
was presented only days before the ceremony. Dealing with such
varying fact patterns is the function of the common law, but
such a scenario reminds one that bright-line rules are unlikely
to remove all uncertainty and unpredictability in this area.
2. U. C. C. and Good Faith
The court in Simeone, when it relegated premarital agree-
ments to a contractual approach, seemed to have in mind some
classical conception of contract encompassing caveat emptor,
naive "plain meaning" enforcement, and little attention to the
relationship between the parties or the larger context within
which the agreement was signed.7 ° If one could apply "con-
tract principles" to premarital agreements, why not apply, by
analogy, the quite different principles underlying Article 2 of the
U.C.C.?17
The U.C.C. obligates parties to exercise good faith in perform-
ing and enforcing the obligations of an agreement,' 2 construes
contractual terms in light of the parties' course of performance
and course of dealing and in light of trade usage,'73 and im-
plies various warranties unless they are expressly excluded.' 4
170. Simeone did offer one difference for premarital agreements: that courts should
view the parties to the agreements as fiduciaries for the purpose of requiring disclo-
sure of financial matters. See Simeone, 581 A.2d at 167 ("Parties to these agree-
ments do not quite deal at arm's length, but rather at the time the contract is en-
tered into stand in a relation of mutual confidence and trust that calls for disclosure
of their financial resources.").
171. This Article discusses the application of U.C.C. principles by analogy. It does
not imply in any way that marriage is, or should be considered, as a kind of "sale
of goods."
172. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989). The Restatement also imposes this requirement. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
173. See U.C.C. §§ 2-202, 2-208.
174. See id. §§ 2-314, 2-315. The text slightly overstates matters, as implied war-
ranties also can be modified or excluded by the parties' course of performance or by
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For contracts of indefinite duration, a party may terminate only
after reasonable notice," 5 and courts sometimes have held ac-
tions apparently authorized by the express wording of a contract
to be bad faith actions in breach of the agreement.7 6 These
changes from classical contract thinking are by no means limited
to U.C.C. cases. 77
If courts apply these types of contract principles to premarital
agreements, there will be far less reason for complaint. Perhaps
courts could interpret the terms of premarital agreements that
appear to be one-sided in more reasonable ways by using the
tools of modern contract law, or by disallowing the strict enforce-
ment of the express terms of some agreements as contrary to
"good faith." These are possibilities that require further thought
and creative suggestion. Also, as discussed in the next section,
modern thinking concerning long-term agreements may provide
useful tools and approaches for interpreting premarital agree-
ments.
B. Different Treatment for Long-Term Contracts?
A growing body of literature has discussed whether contracts
governing long-term commercial relations should be considered,
either by the law or at least by legal commentators, in a way
significantly different from other contracts. 78 Advocates of dif-
usage of trade. See id. § 2-316(3)(c).
175. See id. § 2-309 & cmt. 5.
176. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a lender's contractual right to call in a debt on a demand instrument
was limited by the obligation to act in good faith); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v.
Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the right of seller
to raise prices without notice was limited by good faith obligation).
177. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 90 (1981) (enforcing promises
where there has been detrimental reliance and where injustice only can be avoided
by enforcement); id. at § 205 (imposing on parties a "duty of good faith and fair
dealing"); id. at § 208 ("Unconscionable Contract or Term"); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v.
Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975) (invoking the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine by which, in insurance contracts, a party will not be held to
the plain meaning of a policy term if it is oppressive and contrary to what the in-
sured reasonably would have expected); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E.
214, 215 (N.Y. 1917) (inferring a term where such is required to effect the "business
efficacy" of the agreement).
178. For the argument that courts should treat relational contracts differently, see
189
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ferent treatment argue that "beyond a certain point, contracts
governing long-term relations come to appear less like individual
bargains, in which all the terms can be discerned from the in-
tentions of the parties at the time of formation, and more like
constitutions governing polities-requiring similar modes of on-
going interpretation."'79 Courts should understand the agree-
ment between the parties-in particular, any written agreement
between the parties-in light of the ongoing relationship, they
argue, and the presumptive purpose of court (or arbitrator) in-
tervention should be to maintain that relationship, even if slight
deviation from or supplementation to the precise terms of the
contract is required.''
Those who oppose different treatment assert that with long-
term agreements, as in most places, it is better to enforce terms
strictly as written, as this will reflect better the choices and
preferences of the parties.' Such a method of interpretation,
they argue, is more efficient and avoids the "freedom of contract"
generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980), Jay M. Feinman, Re-
lational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 43 (1993), and Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978). See also
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089 (1981) (expressing support for a particular approach to "best efforts" and
termination provisions in relational contracts, based on the particular tradeoffs in-
volved in such agreements).
For the contrary perspective, that relational contracts should not receive differ-
ent treatment, see Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's
Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175 (1992) (arguing that different
treatment would undermine the freedom of contract, in particular the freedom not to
be contractually liable without a manifestation of one's consent); Richard Craswell,
The Relational Move: Some Questions from Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 91 (1993) (rejecting the search for norms immanent in a relationship; in rela-
tional contracts as in other contracts, substantive moral values and policy choices
should determine what terms should be required or supplied); Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Relational Contracts, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 291-304 (Jack
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (arguing against the application of special
rules to relational contracts, but asserting that contract rules and principles should
be reformulated for a fairer or better application to all contracts); and Schwartz, su-
pra note 119 (pointing out that relational contracts are usually incomplete because of
asymmetrical information, and it would be unwise for courts to supply terms in
those circumstances).
179. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINES 1262 (1995).
180. See, e.g., id. at 1262-65.
181. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 119, at 315-18.
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problem of foisting contractual obligations on parties who never
consented to them.'82 More subtle arguments for this position
maintain that agreements that appear to be "incomplete" are so
because of an asymmetry of information between the parties, or
because of a fear that more "complete" provisions would encour-
age strategic behavior by one of the parties."c
In the context of the dealings between merchants covered by
the U.C.C., Lisa Bernstein recently offered an intriguing critique
of courts and codes that try too hard to find and apply imma-
nent norms in order to maintain long-term relationships."
Certain provisions of the U.C.C. normally are interpreted in
such a way that, when one party to an agreement repeatedly
does not hold the other party strictly to the terms of their agree-
ment, the court will hold that the performance of the parties
reflects the actual terms of the parties' agreement, even though
the performance appears inconsistent with the express
terms." Bernstein argues that such interpretations show a
deep misunderstanding of the parties' actions. A reasonable
commercial party will act one way when it trusts its transaction
partner and when it is trying to enhance the relationship; it will
act another way when the trust is gone and the relationship is
at an "endgame" phase.'86 When courts do not recognize this
distinction, when they enforce "relationship-enhancing" norms
even at an endgame stage, they misunderstand the parties and,
moreover, create unfortunate disincentives to parties offering
such relationship-enhancing concessions during the course of the
commercial relationship.'87
182. Additionally, there is literature detailing the "transaction cost economics" of
continuing relationships. It explains how, due to various factors, including the bound-
ed rationality of the parties, contracts will necessarily be incomplete; therefore, there
will be a need to try to design the contract or the relationship in such a way as to
minimize the incentives the parties have to act opportunistically (rather than cooper-
atively) within the contractual relationship. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcO-
NOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRmS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 29-
34 (1985).
183. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 119, at 272-73.
184. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796-1814 (1996).
185. The most famous or "notorious" example is probably Nanakuli Paving & Rock
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
186. See Bernstein, supra note 184, at 1797-98.
187. See id. at 1796-1806.
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The point for those advocating a particular approach to long-
term and relationship contracts is that one must distinguish
legal standards that may in fact help to maintain the relation-
ship from those that will have no such effect because they will
be applied only in endgame situations. Premarital agree-
ments-at least the vast majority of those subject to court action
and academic commentary-purport to control the endgame situ-
ation:.8 they affect the disposition of property upon separation,
divorce, and death. Though the enforceability of such provisions
may have indirect effects on maintaining the relationship at ear-
lier points,'89 the terms of such agreements become relevant
only when the marriage relationship is already over.
Though it appears, therefore, that the flexible approaches sug-
gested by some courts and commentators for long-term agree-
ments may have a place in understanding the modern approach
to contract law, they are not applicable to divorce-centered pre-
marital agreements, which do not govern the day-to-day mainte-
nance of the marriage relationship. The approaches to long-term
agreements aimed at maintaining relationships would, however,
be highly relevant if and when states start enforcing agreements
focused on the actions and obligations of parties during mar-
riage.
188. One might note that these agreements relate to the endgame of the marriage,
but if there are minor children from the marriage, there will be ongoing connections
between the parents and the children-and between the parents, as regards care of
the children-for which the divorce is at most a stage in the middlegame. The point
remains, however, that because courts do not enforce premarital agreements dealing
with child custody and child support, and because separate laws and norms rule
that domain, the effect of premarital agreements is marginal at best. One also could
argue that in circumstances when a premarital agreement made the process of di-
vorce faster and less hostile-without claiming that premarital agreements usually
have that effect-the agreement could work to the long-term benefit of parents' rela-
tionships with their children.
189. Consider, for example, (1) those who will not marry without having an appar-
ently enforceable agreement, and (2) the spouses-to-be whose views of their partners
are undermined badly when such agreements are presented on the eve of marriage,
proposed agreements that might never have been presented had they not been
thought enforceable.
Additionally, premarital agreements with less than generous terms may rein-
force in a small way an effect created in a strong way by no-fault easy-exit divorce
rules: creating greater (relative) rewards for partners who invest in their own ca-
reers and marketable skills while offering lesser (relative) rewards for investing in
the relationship. See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 4, at 466-69.
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C. The Problem of Rationality
The previous section considered what long-term agreements
might demonstrate about flexible or relationship-enhancing
norms in the regulation of those agreements. This Article now
focuses on long-term agreements for another purpose: for the
issue they, like premarital agreements, raise regarding the ratio-
nality and consent of the parties entering the agreement.
Although both the traditional theories justifying contract law
and the ideas underlying the influential economic analysis of
law assume that people act rationally'" to protect their own
interests, recent work in psychology has begun to question that
assumption.'91 There are particular situations and circum-
stances in which parties are particularly unlikely to act in a
rational way, and the law-especially contract law-should re-
spond to that reality. 92
Premarital agreements are good examples of contracts that
illustrate problems with rational judgment, as they involve long-
term planning and the consideration of possible negative out-
comes at a time when the parties are most likely to be optimistic
that no such negative outcomes will occur. Parties need protec-
tion in this situation because they are unlikely to be able to
think clearly for themselves regarding the consequences of di-
vorce at any time, and certainly not immediately before mar-
riage.'93 Lynn A. Baker and Robert E. Emery have shown that
190. The problem discussed in this section is usually characterized as one of ratio-
nality, but sometimes the discussion goes instead by the characterization of "consent"
or "voluntariness." The three terms arguably touch on different aspects of the same
problem.
191. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982) (containing a collection of articles summarizing recent research "uncovering
judgmental heuristics and exploring their effects"); Special Issue: Rationality, 3 LE-
GAL THEORY 101-210 (1997); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (suggesting an approach to the
economic analysis of law informed by research regarding "bounded rationality"); Eyal
Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229 (1998) (arguing that given
bounded rationality, paternalistic rules can enhance efficiency).
192. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Con-
tract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 213-25 (1995).
193. One could take this sort of argument much further, on the issue of consent to
the marriage itself. "An old French argument on parental consent had it that the
consent of elders was necessary because when a man was under the influence of the
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even those who are well educated in such matters, e.g., law stu-
dents in a family law course, carry an unduly optimistic view
about the chances that their marriage will last." More gener-
al studies in psychology have confirmed that people tend to
evaluate causal theories in a self-serving manner; though people
may know that fifty percent of marriages end in divorce, they
convince themselves-with little grounding for their conclu-
sions-that they have characteristics that will put them in the
portion that will endure.'95 People who assume that they will
not divorce will not work hard to maintain a fair deal contingent
on divorce occurring, just as parties do not bargain hard for rea-
sonable terms on the failure of installment payments, as they do
not expect to ever fail in their payments.'96 Additionally, par-
ties may have some sense of the consequences of failure one year
from now, but it may be harder to foresee and plan for the con-
sequences of failure fifteen years from now-after one or both
partners have made sacrifices in their careers and perhaps after
children have been born.
Robert Nozick argued that one criterion of being in love is the
belief that it-both the feeling and the relationship underlying
it-will go on forever."97 If one thinks that it will end in a few
weeks-or even a few years-then one is not in love."9 ' At the
same time, the cold fact is that approximately one in every two
marriages in the United States will end in divorce.'99 These
facts sit uneasily together; people know divorce is not rare, but
most imperious of the passions, he was not exercising free will." Weisbrod, supra
note 71, at 802 (footnote omitted).
194. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above
Average, 17 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 439 (1993).
195. See Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of
Causal Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 636, 636 (1987).
196. Another clear analogy is an employee's consideration of termination provi-
sions in his employment contract. See generally Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice:
Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993) (ex-
ploring the rationality problems with employment contracts).
197. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 70 (1989).
198. See also W. Somerset Maugham, Red in 1 THE COMPLETE SHORT STORIES OF
W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM 149, 161 (1952) ("'If you had asked them I have no doubt
that they would have thought it impossible to suppose their love could ever cease.
Do we not know that the essential element of love is a belief in its own eternity?'").
199. See Baker, supra note 70, at 226 & n.34, 245 & n.101.
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keeping a pragmatic eye on things-here, on the likelihood of
failure-seems just the type of attitude that may make failure
more likely.
The other problem with scrutinizing rationality or consent in
these sorts of premarital agreements is that the issue is whether
the parties have consented to a change in the standard rules,
that apply to parties during marriage or upon divorce, and it is
far from clear that most people entering a marriage ever knew
of those rules from the beginning. As one commentator wrote,
"even the most oppressive contract of adhesion spells out its sig-
nificant terms, if only in fine print. Not so in marriage.... In
terms of nondisclosure of its legal effects, marriage may be the
ultimate consumer fraud on unsuspecting innocents acting in an
emotional fog."2
Requiring knowledge about waiver in a premarital agreement
may seem strange in a context in which marriage itself effects a
far more significant change in people's rights and duties, and
only one state in fifty requires that those about to be married be
informed about those changes so that they may make a "know-
ing waiver of their rights."0' As Eric Rasmusen and Jeffrey
Stake pointed out recently, an additional factor explaining
people's lack of rational bargaining in entering premarital agree-
ments, and even more clearly in not entering such agreements
when it would be in their interests to do so, is that "most people
were and are unaware of the important behavioral incentives
the terms of divorce create for behavior during marriage."2 '
The premarital agreement is one among a motley variety of
agreements that calls into question the "rationality," "consent,"
or "voluntariness," in the full senses of those concepts, of a party
to the agreement. Someone who chooses freely has no moral ba-
sis for complaining about the consequences of that choice, and
when someone promises freely, she should be held to that prom-
ise. The "freely" in the phrase, however, is usually a shorthand
for optimal conditions in a variety of factors. These conditions
200. HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 89 (3rd ed. 1995).
201. Baker, supra note 70, at 221 (naming Louisiana as the one state requiring
knowledge).
202. Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 4, at 461.
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include: having full information about the consequences of the
choice and the alternatives available; not being coerced by physi-
cal threats, direct economic threats, or dire consequences due to
extreme economic circumstances; and not being subject to strong
emotional desires or irrational psychological tendencies. Some
.contracts are made in conditions approximating the optimal. As
for those that are sufficiently far from the optimal, the legal sys-
tem often will refuse to enforce the resulting contract or will
deem it "voidable," thus allowing the person making the agree-
ment to have it enforced or not enforced at her discretion.0 3
Premarital agreements, by their nature, are less than ideal for
rational bargaining; some sets of facts, like those given in the
section on duress," 4 may push the situation well into the re-
gion of nonenforcement.
An analogy to surrogacy agreements also raises an interesting
issue regarding how the law should approach premarital agree-
ments. One argument for not enforcing surrogacy agreements is
that a not-yet-pregnant woman signing such an agreement can-
not fully appreciate how she might feel after she has carried a
baby to term.0 5 Pregnancy involves myriad physical changes,
including hormonal changes which may have significant emo-
tional and psychological effects. One could argue that, because of
these changes, the person who has given birth is simply "a dif-
ferent person" from her prepregnancy self.06 The prior self
203. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 164, 173, 175, 177 (1981)
(addressing misrepresentation, abuse of fiduciary relation, duress, and undue influ-
ence).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 146-69.
205. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988). The Tennessee Supreme
Court offered a similar analysis in evaluating the enforceability of agreements be-
tween a husband and a wife relating to the disposition of untransferred "pre-embry-
os" from an in-vitro fertilization process. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597
(Tenn. 1992) ('[T]he parties' initial 'informed consent' to IVF procedures will often
not be truly informed because of the near impossibility of anticipating, emotionally
and psychologically, all the turns that events may take as the IVF process un-
folds.").
206. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The "Sophie's Choice" Paradox and the Discon-
tinuous Self- Two Comments on Wertheimer, 74 DENVER U. L. REV. 1255, 1273-78
(1998); see also Virginia Held, Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View, in SCIENCE,
MORALITY & FEMINIST THEORY 111, 126 (Marsha Hanen & Kai Nielson eds., 1987)
("A woman can have decided voluntarily to have a child, but once that decisibn has
been made, she will never again be unaffected by the fact that she has brought this
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should not be able to bind the later self, at least in matters re-
lating to the pregnancy.0 7 At a minimum, society should be
skeptical about the ability of the earlier self to judge the inter-
ests and preferences of the later self. This most obviously will be
true when the woman involved in the surrogacy agreement has
never before been pregnant. It seems a less forceful argument
when the woman has been pregnant previously,08 and the ar-
gument seems to weaken as the woman's experience with preg-
nancy increases. A woman who has been pregnant a number of
times, especially if one of those times was recent, is less well-
placed to argue that she could not know what pregnancy would
do to her, or how she would think about a child she was carrying
after it is born. One might make a comparable argument regard-
ing the extent to which close friends of hers have gone through a
pregnancy, and so on.
A similar type of analysis might apply to the circumstances
surrounding premarital agreements. If it is difficult for many
people to think about the possibility of divorce at the outset of
their marriages, that difficulty likely is less pervasive for people
who have been married a number of times. This is especially
true for those who have gone through divorce more than once, or
have had a recent experience with divorce.
A Pennsylvania court offered a comparable argument on the
difficulty of rational foresight and planning as one reason for not
enforcing, after divorce, a premarital agreement regarding the
religious upbringing of the children."9 The court wrote:
particular child into existence.").
207. Professor Brown expressly limits the argument to voiding surrogacy agree-
ments. See Brown, supra note 206, at 1276 ("[B]y voiding the surrogacy contract we
would not declare all of the woman's decisions suspect, but only those that relate
specifically to the nature of the relationship between mother and child."). Much of
the preceding reasoning, concerning the "prepregnant woman" being a different per-
son from the "post-partum self' and about not giving the former "power over anoth-
er" by enforcing her agreements, id., however, gives the impression of an argument
that could be generalized to negate consent for all forms of agreement, regardless of
their subject matter.
208. But see id. at 1277 & n.68 (suggesting that prior experience with childbirth
does not overcome the problems of rationality and continuity, because subsequent
pregnancies and childbirth experiences may be quite different from earlier ones).
209. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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[W]hile religious upbringing agreements may serve an impor-
tant and beneficial purpose by promoting careful consider-
ation of potential difficulties prior to marriage,.., parties
entering into such agreements generally will not be able to
anticipate the fundamental changes in circumstances be-
tween their prenuptial optimism, their struggles for accom-
modation, and their ultimate post-divorce disillusion-
ment.
2 10
Requiring each party to consult with an independent lawyer
for premarital agreements to be enforceable may partly solve
this problem.21' As lawyers can help clients considering living
wills come to terms with situations they might otherwise not be
able to imagine themselves having to face ("Of course it won't
happen to you... ; but if it did, which kinds of treatments
would you want and which would you not want?"), so a lawyer
might be able to force an overly-optimistic spouse-to-be to think
about the unthinkable in a marriage context ("Of course you will
not get divorced ... ; but if you did, what division of property
would you consider fair?"). As noted earlier, one option is to force
couples about to marry to choose from a menu of options.212
This likely would have the similar effect of forcing parties to
think through matters they otherwise might have been less will-
ing or less able to address. It also would remove the "signaling"
problem-the situation in which a party decides not to present a
premarital agreement, even though the agreement is reasonable
given the couple's circumstances-because the act of presenting
an agreement may make the presenter appear to be saying that
he or she does not think the marriage will last.21 This is not
to say that mandatory recourse to independent counsel, manda-
tory choice among pre-set options, or similar requirements would
avoid all problems of rationality, but only that such tools might
serve to reduce them, for at least some contracting romantic
partners.
210. Id. at 1147.
211. The author is indebted to Scott Altman for the ideas in this paragraph.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 124-30.
213. See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 4, at 461.
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One possibility is to treat premarital agreements as some
courts treat restrictive covenants in employment agreements. As
mentioned above, the two types of agreements raise some obvi-
ous similarities in the problems of consent and rationality.
214
In some jurisdictions, when a court finds a restrictive covenant
unreasonable-e.g, limiting employment for too long a period of
time, or over too broad a geographical area-the court will not
void the provision entirely, but will "blue pencil" it. This method
enforces the provision to the extent reasonable-that is, to the
extent necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the em-
ployer, taking into account the interests of the employee and the
public.215 The question then returns to the basic one of how to
determine what a reasonable agreement would be, an issue
raised earlier.216
Other areas of contract law, including contracts of adhe-
sion, 2 17  and allegedly unconscionable agreements,1 8  raise
substantial questions about the quality of the consent parties
give when entering agreements. In contrast to these agreements,
premarital agreements, though one-sided, ironically may be one
of the few types of agreements many individuals will enter that
are individually drafted-and perhaps also negotiated at arm's
length-rather than constructed from a standard form on take-
it-or-leave-it terms.
The extent to which parties enter premarital agreements with
less than full rationality, consent, or voluntariness is not entire-
ly clear, and it is likely to vary from party to party in different
fact situations. Even if one were to reach the conclusion that
214. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Durapin, Inc. v. American Prods., Inc., 559 A.2d 1051, 1058 (R.I.
1989) (rejecting blue-pencil doctrine and favoring modification and enforcement). See
generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.8, at 384 (1990) (discussing the
"blue-pencil rule").
216. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
217. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169,
173-77 (Iowa 1975) (discussing the application of doctrine of "reasonable expectations"
to an insurance policy, grounded largely on the claim that such policies are adhesion
contracts).
218. See generally Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (defining unconscionability); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (discussing
procedural and substantive unconscionability).
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there is a general and significant problem of rationality, two
related problems follow. First, the problem of rationality is, as
discussed, hardly confined to premarital agreements, but proba-
bly arises in like form whenever there are long-term agreements
or agreements whose duration overlaps major life changes. Con-
sidering how substantial portions of contract law could change
or should change to deal with this issue involves a major re-
thinking well beyond the scope of this Article.
Second, if one accepts that there is a problem of rationality,
what protective rule or available remedy would respond properly
to the problem as it pertains to premarital agreements? The pos-
sibilities mentioned above-making consultation of lawyers a re-
quirement for an enforceable agreement, requiring couples to
choose from a menu of options, and authorizing partial or com-
plete invalidation for certain kinds of one-sided provisions-are
imperfect responses, but they are beginnings.
IV. THE SociAL CONTEXT
Some of the commentary regarding how the courts should
treat premarital agreements has been grounded, expressly or
implicitly, in arguments regarding the social context in which
people enter such agreements. When considering such argu-
ments, it is important to separate out those that use the social
context to argue for a different treatment of agreements in gen-
eral or of all agreements between parties of widely unequal bar-
gaining power, and those that focus specifically or especially on
premarital agreements. This is not to object to the wisdom of
far-reaching general reforms or the proposition that general re-
forms sometimes must be enacted piecemeal, but only to avoid
the confusion that can result when an argument against a treat-
ment of a particular kind of contract is misunderstood as an ar-
gument concerning contract doctrine generally.
The two most common arguments addressing social context in
this area derive from concerns about pervasive gender inequality
and concerns about pervasive inequalities of resources and so-
phistication among potential contracting parties generally. The
sections below treat the topics in turn. The first seems to have
more direct applicability to premarital agreements than the sec-
ond, but both are relevant in considering whether to enforce par-
ticular agreements.
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A. The Issue of Gender Equality
As far as the research for this Article shows, all statutory and
decision-based law on premarital agreements is and has been
facially neutral on gender matters. Advocates for various posi-
tions on the enforcement of premarital agreements, however,
have seen the issue as one substantially tied to gender equality.
First, the court in Simeone argued that the standard of the fair-
ness approach, allowing enforcement of premarital agreements
only if substantive and procedural fairness were proven, reflect-
ed a paternalistic attitude toward women that had lost justifica-
tion.219 The court stated that earlier decisions regarding the
enforcement of premarital agreements had "rested upon a belief
that spouses are of unequal status and that women are not
knowledgeable enough to understand the nature of contracts
that they enter,"220 and that this belief was no longer war-
ranted.
A more common way of connecting the enforcement of premar-
ital agreements to gender equality is by the proposition that
courts should continue or strengthen the requirements of sub-
stantive and procedural fairness because the actual effect of
neutral, nonintrusive rules would be to impoverish women, who
tend to be the poorer parties being asked to waive their rights in
such agreements.22' For example, Gail Frommer Brod supports
her conclusion that the enforcement of premarital agreements
219. See Sineone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
220. Id. The opinion continued:
Society has advanced ... to the point where women are no longer re-
garded as the "weaker" party in marriage, or in society generally ...
Nor is there viability in the presumption that women are uninformed,
uneducated, and readily subjected to unfair advantage in marital agree-
ments. Indeed, women nowadays quite often have substantial education,
financial awareness, income, and assets.
Id. Needless to say, there are many who would disagree with the above comments.
See, e.g., id. at 168 (Papadakos, J., concurring) ("I fear my colleague[s] do[] not live
in the real world.").
221. See Atwood, supra note 34, at 132-34, 154; Brod, supra note 2, at 283-87;
Singer, supra note 80, at 1540-49 ("Disadvantages of Privatization: . . . Exacerbation
of Existing Gender Inequalities"); see also Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1509-13
(1983) (arguing that nonintervention in domestic matters only serves to reinforce
existing financial and physical inequalities within intimate relationships).
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"generally harm[s]" women and the children in their care in
large part on the grounds that men are disproportionate among
the wealthy, that women are disproportionate among the poor,
and that women's average income is significantly lower than
men's. 2 As the legal attitude toward premarital agreements
becomes more accepting and less intrusive, the argument goes,
women are ever more likely to feel an overall negative effect. In
Brod's words, "[b]y ignoring women's de facto inequality, law-
makers reforming the law of premarital agreements have over-
looked the adverse economic impact that premarital agreements
have on women as a class. Lawmakers should recognize premar-
ital agreements for what they are: contracts that violate societal
norms against gender discrimination."223
From a similar set of starting assumptions, one can focus on
the point of agreement rather than on the effect of enforcement.
If women tend to be in circumstances that constrain their choic-
es and make them appear less than entirely free, there might be
some argument for nonenforcement. This argument, however,
may have deleterious effects of its own. As one commentator
summarized the dilemma: "Is it possible to protect women from
the oppressive consequences of harmful, constrained choices...
without divesting women of agency?"224
Additional issues arise if one were to begin to see premarital
agreements in gendered terms, taking it as generally true that
women will be the economically weaker party whose rights are
generally bargained away in such agreements. For example, one
should consider the argument by Robin West that women, by na-
ture, may be more likely to accede to authority or to enter mas-
222. See Brod, supra note 2, at 240-42. At one point in her article, Brod appears to
equate, or at least to invite the equation, of greater income, resources, and experi-
ence with greater bargaining power in entering a premarital agreement. See id. at
247 & n.89. It is probably worth clarifying that in the context of premarital agree-
ments, "bargaining power" belongs to the party less desirous of getting mar-
ried-which may sometimes be the party who has fewer resources. Although
anecdotally it usually is the woman who is more desirous of getting married, there
also will be numerous occasions when it is the man, and there seems little reason
to believe that the level of the parties' resources will correlate (in a positive or neg-
ative way) with their desire to marry.
223. Id. at 279.
224. Hadfield, supra note 110, at 1236-37.
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ochistic situations.2" Also, some have argued that women are
disadvantaged in general by bargaining, whether in negotiating
contracts or in mediation processes, as they are by nature or
socialization less selfish and less self-centered. 6
There are contrary arguments that enforcing agreements of
this sort better serves women. Even in the context of surrogacy
agreements, one court stated: "The argument that a woman can-
not knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and deliver a
baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning
that for centuries prevented women from attaining equal eco-
nomic rights and professional status under the law."227 One ar-
gument thus is that "equal treatment" or "equal respect" would
entail enforcing the agreements women enter even in these areas
of law.228 Another might be that there is a strong feminist ar-
gument for enforcing especially these sorts of agreements. Mar-
tha Fineman recently wrote, regarding contracts for sexual or
reproductive services: "It is interesting to note from the perspec-
tive of contract as a metaphor for bargaining that human activi-
ties in which women might be considered to have either a
'natural' monopoly or to possess more on the 'supply' than
'demand' side of the equation have been written out of con-
tract."229 Brod's argument that there should be fairness tests
for premarital agreements because they, in practice,
disproportionately affect women ° invites the above response
that equal respect requires no special treatment. Fineman's ar-
gument,"' which implies that the power to contract has been
225. See Robin West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV.
384 (1985) [hereinafter, West, Authority]; Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Eth-
ics: A Reply to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1986); Robin L. West, The Dif-
ference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal
Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
226. See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 4, at 472-73 & nn.83-89 (summarizing ar-
gument and citing sources).
227. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993).
228. See id.
229. Fineman, Contract, supra note 92, at 187.
230. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
231. See supra text accompanying note 229. Fineman's reference to women having a
"natural monopoly" is true in part, but it requires some refinement. Within a com-
mitted heterosexual pairing, a woman has a "monopoly" over certain reproductive
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removed in some areas perhaps because women have greater
power in those areas, applies to sexual and reproductive servic-
es, but not in as obvious a way to premarital agreements.
Anecdotally or stereotypically, it is the woman who more often
wants the commitment of marriage while the man resists-and
thus, if this stereotype were always true, it would be the woman
more often than the man who would be willing to waive rights to
enter into marriage-though there are certainly many situations
in which the roles are reversed.
Additionally, one must consider the now-standard argument
that rules or standards meant to protect weaker parties by al-
lowing them to avoid contractual obligations may actually work
against that group. This "protection" makes it harder for them to
enter agreements they want to enter because other parties will
refuse to enter agreements with members of the group when
they know that the members of the group can avoid enforce-
ment.232 The application to premarital agreements was dis-
cussed earlier: There may be situations when a woman would
only be able to marry if she were able to bind herself to a pre-
marital agreement, and she would prefer to be married with the
agreement rather than unmarried and "protected" from that
agreement."'
B. Other Inequalities
Another line of argument against enforcing premarital agree-
ments relates to the instances in which one party appears to be
imposing one-sided terms on the other party, regardless of the
and sexual services; however, in a different perspective, taking into account the way
that commitments may break down (or may never have been established), individual
women are "in competition with" one another, and the monopoly metaphor does not
apply. Still, from either perspective, it is worth pointing out that women have a
comparative bargaining advantage relative to the men with whom they are bargaining.
232. See, e.g., Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir.
1983) (arguing that allowing financial difficulty by itself to be sufficient to plead eco-
nomic duress, and thus make agreements voidable, would be contrary to the inter-
ests of financially strapped companies, as they would be unable to enter into binding
financial settlements when they wanted to do so).
233. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
204 [Vol. 40:145
1998] ENFORCEMENT OF PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS
gender of the more powerful party. One group of commentators
offered the following critique of Simeone:
Simeone applies laissez-faire with a vengeance. Although the
majority might like to think of its opinion as modern, much
of its style of reasoning actually comes straight out of the end
of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.
Back then, courts made the same kind of assumption that
specifics of the law of contract could be logically deduced from
more abstract notions of equality. For example, during the
period of American constitutional law history known as the
Lochner era... courts invalidated protective labor legislation
on the basis that political equality logically implied freedom
of contract-that derogation from the principles of freedom of
contract involved improper paternalistic assumptions about
the inferiority of workingmen.'
The point here is that the relationship between men and women
in general or between some men and women only has the ap-
pearance of equality and voluntary choice. The facts of the situa-
tion are those of unequal power and the coerced choices and un-
fair agreements which result from such facts.235
It is a point worth making, but it is not a point that seems
limited to the premarital agreements or even to the domestic
context in general. In all parts of life, and not just in relation-
ships between men and women, people enter substantively un-
fair agreements because their relative lack of power leaves them
little or no other choice. It is a general policy question that the
legal system must answer: To what extent is the state going to
intervene to try to protect weaker parties and to correct imbal-
ances? 6
Much of the point of the previous sections of this Article has
been that there are resources within modern contract thinking
to respond to the more egregious forms of one party taking ad-
vantage of another in a premarital agreement. These principles
234. WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 73
(1994).
235. Momentarily separated are the arguments based on the arguably gendered
nature of the inequalities in these situations.
236. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92
YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
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may not guarantee complete fairness in the execution or enforce-
ment of agreements, but they can help move society toward that
goal. Beyond that, the question remains whether there should be
a systematic change of the approach to contracts or, perhaps, to
the approach to contracts in long-term and relational agree-
ments, and that question goes far beyond the scope of this
Article.
Obviously, the question of legal reform to effect fairness is a
difficult and subtle problem. First, though the legal system
should not too quickly acquiesce to injustice, there likely are
limits on the extent to which law can rectify or compensate for
inequities pervasive in society.237 As noted earlier, for those
without power, sometimes the only alternative to a bad bargain
is no bargain at all, and it is not clear why it always would be to
someone's benefit to have that choice taken away."8 Though,
also as noted earlier, there may be reasons in some circumstanc-
es to take the choice away. 9 Second, attempts to protect often
have other unintended negative consequences beyond the mere
withdrawal of choice.240
CONCLUSION
It is a mistake to try to evaluate the enforceability of premari-
tal agreements without considering the larger context their con-
sideration evokes-e.g., the way society thinks about marriage
and, in particular, the extent to which marriage is or should be
a matter of private ordering; the proper legal treatment of long-
term agreements, especially those agreements that raise issues
237. Fineman elaborates on a similar point concerning the limitations of law in
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 92, at 15-20.
238. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
239. See Brown, supra note 206, at 1255-62 (noting that there are circumstances
when no choice is better than having choice because of the horrible or tragic nature
of the choosing); West, Authority, supra note 225 (noting that some people, especially
women, sometimes may be inclined to act in a masochistic way or a way unduly
submissive to authority).
240. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955, 1031 (1984) (discussing how legislation benefitting pregnant employees
could be "so trivial that its primary function is to reinforce stereotypical ideas about
men and women" or "so substantial that it is likely that those required to provide it
would avoid dealing with women in order to escape it" (footnote omitted)).
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of rationality; and the proper legal treatment for agreements
that come against a background of systemic inequalities.
Substantial reasons exist for enforcing premarital agreements,
reasons often connected with the protection of significant reli-
ance by one or both of the parties. Although there also are rea-
sons to fear extreme procedural and substantive unfairness in
these agreements, modern contract law has ample resources for
protecting weaker parties from most, though probably not all,
such instances of grave injustice. A likely approach would set
requirements (e.g., full disclosure of assets and consultation with
independent counsel) and bright-line rules or presumptions (e.g.,
agreements presented within days of a wedding, when they
could have been presented weeks or months earlier, will be pre-
sumptively considered voidable for duress) for these agreements.
Such an approach could support reasonable reliance, but, alter-
natively, might also lead to unfair results in some individual
cases.
If a state were sufficiently worried about the unfair results in
the individual cases for which bright-line rules and conventional
contract doctrines would give insufficient protection, it might be
justified in choosing as an alternative a case-by-case, all-things-
considered approach to enforcement."M The disadvantage of
such an approach, as indicated above, would be that it makes it
difficult for any party to rely on enforcement, and those who
would not act (e.g., would not marry in a certain situation) with-
out reasonable assurances that a court will enforce the agree-
ments they enter would then not act. Depending on one's fears
regarding the frequency with which premarital agreements ef-
fect injustice, this cost nonetheless may be considered worth
paying.
241. A case-by-case approach sometimes seems to be a cowardly way out, passing
on the hard decisions to others-initially and primarily in this case, the family court
judges. If, however, one determines that the important factors to consider were too
numerous and various, there may be little choice. Courts have reached similar con-
clusions in family law probably more often than any other area of dispute, especially
in the way the all-things-considered "best interests of the child" standard is perva-
sive for most decisions involving children.
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